Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification
Abstract
Recent studies show that the state-of-the-art deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples, resulting from small-magnitude perturbations added to the input. Given that that emerging physical systems are using DNNs in safety-critical situations, adversarial examples could mislead these systems and cause dangerous situations. Therefore, understanding adversarial examples in the physical world is an important step towards developing resilient learning algorithms. We propose a general attack algorithm, Robust Physical Perturbations (RP2), to generate robust visual adversarial perturbations under different physical conditions. Using the real-world case of road sign classification, we show that adversarial examples generated using RP2 achieve high targeted misclassification rates against standard-architecture road sign classifiers in the physical world under various environmental conditions, including viewpoints. Due to the current lack of a standardized testing method, we propose a two-stage evaluation methodology for robust physical adversarial examples consisting of lab and field tests. Using this methodology, we evaluate the efficacy of physical adversarial manipulations on real objects. With a perturbation in the form of only black and white stickers, we attack a real stop sign, causing targeted misclassification in 100% of the images obtained in lab settings, and in 84.8% of the captured video frames obtained on a moving vehicle (field test) for the targ…
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The lifecycle of the development of a typical AI product can be partitioned into data preparation, algorithm design, development-deployment, and management.
“As shown by the solid-lined boxes in Figure 2, the lifecycle of the development of a typical AI product can be partitioned into data preparation, algorithm design, development-deployment, and management [25].”
From Trustworthy AI: From Principles to Practices (2023) · cites this paper as [25]
External attacks threaten the safety of autonomous driving.
“Poor model performance as well as external attacks [25, 16] both threaten its safety.”
From Trustworthy AI: From Principles to Practices (2023) · cites this paper as [25]
Poor model performance threatens the safety of autonomous driving.
“Poor model performance as well as external attacks [25, 16] both threaten its safety.”
From Trustworthy AI: From Principles to Practices (2023) · cites this paper as [25]
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References 44 · Cited by 2,173
- Authors
- Eykholt, K., Evtimov, I., Fernandes, E., Li, B., Rahmati, A., Xiao, C., Prakash, A., Kohno, T., & Song, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- University of Washington (US)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Stony Brook University (US)
- ORCID
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-06
- Pages
- 1625-1634
- ISSN
- 1063-6919 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2798302089
- Cited by
- 2,173
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2026: 150 · 2025: 257 · 2024: 281 · 2023: 325 · 2022: 301 · 2021: 388 · 2020: 283 · 2019: 146 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 2
- FWCI
- 87.10
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Advanced Neural Network Applications
- Keywords
- physical adversarial attacks, adversarial examples, deep neural network robustness, visual categorization, road sign classification, viewpoint robustness, safety-critical systems
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