Cited by 132Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningDigital Media Forensic DetectionFace recognition and analysis

Improving transferability of adversarial patches on face recognition with generative models

Open access
Xiao, Zihao, Gao, Xianfeng, Fu, Chilin, Dong, Yinpeng, Gao, Wei, Zhang, Xiaolu, Zhou, Jun, Zhu, Jun·2021·2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)

Abstract

Face recognition is greatly improved by deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs). Recently, these face recognition models have been used for identity authentication in security sensitive applications. However, deep CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial patches, which are physically realizable and stealthy, raising new security concerns on the real-world applications of these models. In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of face recognition models using adversarial patches based on transferability, where the attacker has limited accessibility to the target models. First, we extend the existing transfer-based attack techniques to generate transferable adversarial patches. However, we observe that the transferability is sensitive to initialization and degrades when the perturbation magnitude is large, indicating the overfitting to the substitute models. Second, we propose to regularize the adversarial patches on the low dimensional data manifold. The manifold is represented by generative models pre-trained on legitimate human face images. Using face-like features as adversarial perturbations through optimization on the manifold, we show that the gaps between the responses of substitute models and the target models dramatically decrease, exhibiting a better transferability. Extensive digital world experiments are conducted to demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method in the black-box setting. We apply the proposed method in the physical world as well.

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  • Adversarial attacks against face recognition have recently been proved as a new type of threat.

    “Besides presentation attacks, adversarial attacks against face recognition have recently been proved as a new type of threat.”

    From Trustworthy AI: From Principles to Practices (2023) · cites this paper as [90]

  • Face recognition systems can be easily spoofed by impersonation attackers wearing a small printed adversarial patch.

    “Research has shown that face recognition systems can be easily spoofed by impersonation attackers wearing a small printed adversarial patch [90, 30, 43, 73].”

    From Trustworthy AI: From Principles to Practices (2023) · cites this paper as [90]

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Research works printed but not linked: 16

  1. huang, 2007, Labeled faces in the wild: A database for studying face recognition in unconstrained environments, Technical Report 07-49
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Authors
Xiao, Z., Gao, X., Fu, C., Dong, Y., Gao, W., Zhang, X., Zhou, J., & Zhu, J.
Affiliations
  • Beijing Institute of Technology (CN)
  • Ant Group (China) (CN)
  • Tsinghua University (CN)
  • Nanyang Technological University (SG)
Venue
2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2021-06
Pages
11840-11849
ISSN
1063-6919 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3179647175
Cited by
132
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 1
FWCI
10.05
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings - IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition/Proceedings (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Face recognition and analysis
Keywords
adversarial patches, face recognition, transferability, black-box attacks, generative models, adversarial perturbations, model robustness, physical assault

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