The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Computer-attack graph generation tool
Abstract
This paper presents a tool for assessment of security attributes and vulnerabilities in computer networks. The tool generates attack graphs (Phillips and Swiler, 1998). Each node in the attack graph represents a possible attack state. Edges represent a change of state caused by a single action taken by the attacker or unwitting assistant, and are weighted by some metric (such as attacker effort or time to succeed). Generation of the attack graph requires algorithms that match information about attack requirements (specified in attack templates) to information about the network configuration and assumed attacker capabilities (attacker profile). The set of near-optimal shortest paths indicates the most exploitable components of the system configuration. This paper presents the status of the tool and discusses implementation issues, especially focusing on the data input needs and methods for eliminating redundant paths and nodes in the graph.
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Citations
Cites
Rayward-Smith, V. J. (1991) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1057/jors.1991.155 · Cited by 16,821
A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Phillips, C., & Swiler, L. P. (1998) · Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms · doi:10.1145/310889.310919 · Cited by 828
Self-citationComputer Security Technology Planning Study
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Experimenting with quantitative evaluation tools for monitoring operational security
Ortalo, R., Deswarte, Y., & Kaaniche, M. (1999) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/32.815323 · Cited by 404
Quantitative Assessment of Operational Security: Models and Tools *
Daciér, M., & Deswarte, Y. (1996) · Cited by 97
Moskowitz, I. S., & Kang, M. H. (1997) · doi:10.1145/283699.283741 · Cited by 28
On suboptimal alignments of biological sequences
Naor, D., & Brutlag, D. L. (2005) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/bfb0029805 · Cited by 25
A representation of protocol attacks for risk assessment
Meadows, C. A. (1997) · DIMACS series in discrete mathematics and theoretical computer science · doi:10.1090/dimacs/038/01 · Cited by 11
(1990)
Cited by
Automated generation and analysis of attack graphs
Sheyner, O., Haines, J., Jha, S., Lippmann, R., & Wing, J. M. (2005) · Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004377 · Cited by 1,293
Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis
Ammann, P., Wijesekera, D., & Kaushik, S. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586110.586140 · Cited by 697
Two formal analyses of attack graphs
Jha, S., Sheyner, O., & Wing, J. (2003) · Proceedings 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-15 · doi:10.1109/csfw.2002.1021806 · Cited by 494
Practical Attack Graph Generation for Network Defense
Ingols, K., Lippmann, R., & Piwowarski, K. (2006) · 2006 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06) · doi:10.1109/acsac.2006.39 · Cited by 379
Hierarchical, model-based risk management of critical infrastructures
Baiardi, F., Telmon, C., & Sgandurra, D. (2009) · Reliability Engineering & System Safety · doi:10.1016/j.ress.2009.02.001 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Swiler, L. P., Phillips, C., Ellis, D., & Chakerian, S.
- Venue
- Proceedings DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition II. DISCEX'01
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc
- Published
- 2002-11-13
- Volume
- 2
- Pages
- 307-321
- OpenAlex
- W2117694832
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 8.68
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Swiler, L. P., Phillips, C., Ellis, D., & Chakerian, S. (2002). Computer-attack graph generation tool. Proceedings DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition II. DISCEX'01. https://doi.org/10.1109/discex.2001.932182
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