A defense-centric taxonomy based on attack manifestations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many classifications of attacks have been tendered, often in taxonomic form, A common basis of these taxonomies is that they have been framed from the perspective of an attacker - they organize attacks with respect to the attacker's goals, such as privilege elevation from user to root (from the well known Lincoln taxonomy). Taxonomies based on attacker goals are attack-centric; those based on defender goals are defense-centric. Defenders need a way of determining whether or not their detectors will detect a given attack. It is suggested that a defense-centric taxonomy would suit this role more effectively than an attack-centric taxonomy. This paper presents a new, defense-centric attack taxonomy, based on the way that attacks manifest as anomalies in monitored sensor data. Unique manifestations, drawn from 25 attacks, were used to organize the taxonomy, which was validated through exposure to an intrusion-detection system, confirming attack detect ability. The taxonomy's predictive utility was compared against that of a well-known extant attack-centric taxonomy. The defense-centric taxonomy is shown to be a more effective predictor of a detector's ability to detect specific attacks, hence informing a defender that a given detector is competent against an entire class of attacks.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Killourhy, K. S., Maxion, R. A., & Tan, K. M. C.
- Affiliations
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- ORCID
- Maxion, R.A.
- Venue
- International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2004
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2004
- Pages
- 102-111
- ISSN
- 1530-0889 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2127894355
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2019: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 3.64
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- attack taxonomy, attack detection, intrusion detection systems, anomaly detection, sensor data
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