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Cited by 49Cryptography and Data SecurityAdvanced Authentication Protocols SecurityUser Authentication and Security Systems

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PESTO: Proactively Secure Distributed Single Sign-On, or How to Trust a Hacked Server

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Baum, Carsten, Frederiksen, Tore, Hesse, Julia, Lehmann, Anja, Yanai, Avishay·2020·2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
DOI 10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00044
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Abstract

Single Sign-On (SSO) is becoming an increasingly popular authentication method for users that leverages a trusted Identity Provider (IdP) to bootstrap secure authentication tokens from a single user password. It alleviates some of the worst security issues of passwords, as users no longer need to memorize individual passwords for all service providers, and it removes the burden of these service to properly protect huge password databases. However, SSO also introduces a single point of failure. If compromised, the IdP can impersonate all users and learn their master passwords. To remedy this risk while preserving the advantages of SSO, Agrawal et al. (CCS'18) recently proposed a distributed realization termed PASTA (password-authenticated threshold authentication) which splits the role of the IdP across n servers. While PASTA is a great step forward and guarantees security as long as not all servers are corrupted, it uses a rather inflexible corruption model: servers cannot be corrupted adaptively and - even worse - cannot recover from corruption. The latter is known as proactive security and allows servers to re-share their keys, thereby rendering all previously compromised information useless. In this work, we improve upon the work of PASTA and propose a distributed SSO protocol with proactive and adaptive security (PESTO), guaranteeing security as long as not all servers are compromised at the same time. We prove our scheme secure in the UC framework which is known to provi…

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  • It is not possible to brute force attack user passwords because of the partially-oblivious distributed pseudo-random functions used for distributed password authentication.

    “Moreover, it is not possible to brute force attack user passwords because of the partially-oblivious distributed pseudo-random functions [37] used for distributed password authentication.”

    From A Trusted Approach for Decentralised and Privacy-Preserving Identity Management (2021) · cites this paper as [37]

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References 35 · Cited by 49

Research works printed but not linked: 45

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Metadata

Authors
Baum, C., Frederiksen, T., Hesse, J., Lehmann, A., & Yanai, A.
Affiliations
  • Aarhus University (DK)
  • Alexandra Institute (Denmark) (DK)
  • IBM Research - Zurich (CH)
  • Hasso Plattner Institute (DE)
  • VMware (United States) (US)
ORCID
Venue
2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2020-09
Volume
2019
Pages
587-606
DOI
10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00044
OpenAlex
W3003831591
Cited by
49
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2
FWCI
2.01
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (publishedVersion)
  • IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (submittedVersion)
  • Scopus (Elsevier) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
Keywords
single sign-on, distributed authentication, proactive security, adaptive corruptions, pasta, pesto, two-round protocols, RSA assumption

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