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COCA: a secure distributed online certification authority

Lidong Zhou, Schneider, F.B., Van Renesse, R. · 2004 · Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]

Abstract

COCA is a fault-tolerant and secure on-line certification authority that has been built and deployed both in a local area network and in the Internet. Replication is used to achieve availability; proactive recovery with threshold cryptography is used for digitally signing certificates in a way that defends against mobile adversaries which attack, compromise, and control one replica for a limited period of time before moving on to another. Relatively weak assumptions characterize environments in which COCA''s protocols will execute correctly. No assumption is made about execution speed and message delivery delays; channels are expected to exhibit only intermittent reliability; and with 3t+1 COCA servers up to t may be faulty or compromised. The result is a system with inherent defenses to certain denial of service attacks because, by their very nature, weak assumptions are difficult for attackers to invalidate. In addition, traditional techniques, including request authorization, resource management based on segregation and scheduling different classes of requests, as well as caching results of expensive cryptographic operations further reduce COCA''s vulnerability to denial of service attacks. Results from experiments in a local area network and the Internet allow a quantitative evaluation of the various means COCA employs to resist denial of service attacks.

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Metadata

Authors
Zhou, L., Schneider, F. B., & Van Renesse, R.
Venue
Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2004-07-08
Volume
938
Pages
152-191
OpenAlex
W2290132939
Cited by
163
References
2
FWCI
17.35
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: COCA: a secure distributed online certification authority. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/fits.2003.1264932
The paper
Zhou, L., Schneider, F. B., & Van Renesse, R. (2004). COCA: a secure distributed online certification authority. Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]. https://doi.org/10.1109/fits.2003.1264932

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.