The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Linux security modules: general security support for the linux kernel
Abstract
The access control mechanisms of existing mainstream operating systems are inadequate to provide strong system security. Enhanced access control mechanisms have failed to win acceptance into mainstream operating systems due in part to a lack of consensus within the security community on the right solution. Since generalpurpose operating systems must satisfy a wide range of user requirements, any access control mechanism integrated into such a system must be capable of supporting many different access control models. The Linux Security Modules (LSM) project has developed a lightweight, general purpose, access control framework for the mainstream Linux kernel that enables many different access control models to be implemented as loadable kernel modules. A number of existing enhanced access control implementations, including Linux capabilities, SecurityEnhanced Linux (SELinux), and Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE), have already been adapted to use the LSM framework. This paper presents the design and implementation of LSM and discusses the challenges in providing a truly general solution that minimally impacts the Linux kernel.
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Cited by
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UNICORN: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent Threats
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BackgroundMethodContainer Security: Issues, Challenges, and the Road Ahead
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wright, C., Cowan, C., Morris, J., Smalley, S., & Kroah-Hartman, G.
- Venue
- Foundations of Intrusion Tolerant Systems, 2003 [Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems]
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2004-07-08
- Pages
- 213-226
- OpenAlex
- W2150858564
- Cited by
- 442
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 52.65
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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