The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cryptography against Continuous Memory Attacks
Abstract
We say that a cryptographic scheme is Continuous Leakage-Resilient (CLR), if it allows users to refresh their secret keys, using only fresh local randomness, such that: 1. The scheme remains functional after any number of key refreshes, although the public key never changes. Thus, the “outside world'' is neither affected by these key refreshes, nor needs to know about their frequency. 2. The scheme remains secure even if the adversary can continuously leak arbitrary information about the current secret-key, as long as the amount of leaked information is bounded in between any two successive key refreshes. There is no bound on the total amount of information that can be leaked during the lifetime of the system. In this work, we construct a variety of practical CLR schemes, including CLR one-way relations, CLR signatures, CLR identification schemes, and CLR authenticated key agreement protocols. For each of the above, we give general constructions, and then show how to instantiate them efficiently using a well established assumption on bilinear groups, called the K-Linear assumption (for any constant K greater than or equal to 1). Our constructions are highly modular, and we develop many interesting techniques and building-blocks along the way, including: leakage-indistinguishable re-randomizable relations, homomorphic NIZKs, and leakage-of-cipher text non-malleable encryption schemes.
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Citations
Cites
Micali, S. (2000) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/s0097539795284959 · Cited by 424
Overcoming the Hole in the Bucket: Public-Key Cryptography Resilient to Continual Memory Leakage
Brakerski, Z., Kalai, Y. T., Katz, J., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2010) · 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2010.55 · Cited by 242 · cited 3×
“Brakerski et al. [10] show that a particular CLR scheme is secure w.r.t. logarithmic (in the security parameter) amount of such leakage.”
Method
Cited by
BiTR: Built-in Tamper Resilience
Choi, S. G., Kiayias, A., & Malkin, T. (2011) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_40 · Cited by 590
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
Naor, M., & Segev, G. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_2 · Cited by 403
Overcoming the Hole in the Bucket: Public-Key Cryptography Resilient to Continual Memory Leakage
Brakerski, Z., Kalai, Y. T., Katz, J., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2010) · 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2010.55 · Cited by 242
“In work done concurrently with our own, Dodis, et al. [ 13 ] construct efficient signature schemes, identification schemes, and authenticated key-agreement protocols that are secure in the model of continual memory leakage.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Dodis, Y., Haralambiev, K., Lopez-Alt, A., & Wichs, D.
- Venue
- 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2010-10
- Pages
- 511-520
- ISSN
- 0272-5428 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1970187925
- Cited by
- 239
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 20.53
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cryptography against Continuous Memory Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/focs.2010.56
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- Dodis, Y., Haralambiev, K., Lopez-Alt, A., & Wichs, D. (2010). Cryptography against Continuous Memory Attacks. 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2010.56
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