Poisoning attacks to compromise face templates
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Adaptive biometric systems update clients' templates during operation to account for natural changes over time (e.g., aging of biometric templates). Recently, it has been shown that this update can be exploited by an attacker to compromise the clients' templates: by presenting a proper sequence of fake biometric traits to the sensor, the attacker may eventually impersonate the targeted clients without any fake trait, and even force the system to deny access to them. This attack has however been shown only for PCA-based face verification, with one template per client, under worstcase assumptions about the attacker's knowledge of the sys-tem. In this paper, we show that it can be successful even in the case of multiple templates per client, for different matchers, and under more realistic scenarios, and validate it by experiments to highlight its practical relevance.
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Cites
Huang, L., Joseph, A. D., Nelson, B., Rubinstein, B. I. P., & Tygar, J. D. (2011) · Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Security and artificial intelligence · doi:10.1145/2046684.2046692 · Cited by 1,194 · cited 1×
“According to a recent taxonomy of potential attacks against machine learning algorithms [5], the attacker’s goal can be defined by the desired security violation, which may be an integrity, availability, or privacy violation.”
BackgroundCasting out Demons: Sanitizing Training Data for Anomaly Sensors
Cretu, G. F., Stavrou, A., Locasto, M. E., Stolfo, S. J., & Keromytis, A. D. (2008) · 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008) · doi:10.1109/sp.2008.11 · Cited by 226 · cited 2×
“3, one may adopt fusion rules that produce similar effects to data sanitization [2] (like the mean rule), namely, that prevent some of the client’s templates to be shifted too far from the rest of the gallery.”
Background
Cited by
Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning
Chen, X., Liu, C., Li, B., Lu, K., & Song, D. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1712.05526 · Cited by 1,039
“After presenting the details of the threat model above, we emphasize again the differences between this work and a long line of existing work studying poisoning attacks and defenses [10], [38], [12], [11], [68], [44], [9], [35], [70], [39], [61].”
BackgroundLocal Model Poisoning Attacks to Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning
Fang, M., Cao, X., Jia, J., & Gong, N. Z. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1911.11815 · Cited by 828
“Attacker’s goal: Like many studies on poisoning attacks [7, 8, 30, 33, 50, 62, 65], we consider an attacker’s goal is to manipulate the learnt global model such that it has a high error rate indiscriminately for testing examples.”
BackgroundAdversarial Robustness Toolbox v1.0.0
Nicolae, M.-I., Sinn, M., Tran, M. N., Buesser, B., Rawat, A., Wistuba, M., Zantedeschi, V., Baracaldo, N., Chen, B., Ludwig, H., et al. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1807.01069 · Cited by 594
“The defences parameter is either a string or a list of strings selecting the defences to be applied from the following: – featsqueeze[1-8]? for feature squeezing, where the digit at the end indicates the bit depth (see Section 6.”
BackgroundStealing Hyperparameters in Machine Learning
Wang, B., & Gong, N. Z. (2018) · 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2018.00038 · Cited by 470
A Survey on Security Threats and Defensive Techniques of Machine Learning: A Data Driven View
Liu, Q., Li, P., Zhao, W., Cai, W., Yu, S., & Leung, V. C. M. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2805680 · Cited by 421
Metadata
- Authors
- Biggio, B., Didaci, L., Fumera, G., & Roli, F.
- Venue
- 2013 International Conference on Biometrics (ICB)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-06
- Pages
- 1-7
- OpenAlex
- W2088454850
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 2.50
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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