The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Micro-Grid Distribution Networks
Abstract
Micro-grid distribution networks that use distributed energy sources are expected to lie at the heart of the emerging smart grid technology. While existing approaches have focused on control and communication aspects in micro-grids, this paper use coalitional game theory to study novel cooperative strategies between the micro-grids of a distribution network. For this purpose, a coalitional game is formulated between a number of micro-grids (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines, PHEVs, etc.) that are, each, servicing a group of consumers (or an area) and that are connected to a macro-grid substation. For forming coalitions, an algorithm is proposed to allow the micro-grids to autonomously cooperate and self-organize into a partition composed of disjoint micro-grid coalitions. Each formed coalition consists of micro-grids that have a surplus of power to transfer or sell and of micro-grids that need to buy or acquire additional power to meet their demand. Within every coalition, the micro-grids coordinate the power transfer among themselves as well as with the macro-grid station, in a way to optimize a utility function that captures the total losses over the distribution power lines. Also, the proposed algorithm allows the micro-grids, in a distributed manner, to self-adapt to environmental changes such as variations in the power needs of the micro-grids. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm yields a reduction in terms of the average power losses (over the distribution line) per micro-grid, reaching up to 31% improvement relative to the non-cooperative case.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationA GENERIC APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION
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Cited by
State of the Art in Research on Microgrids: A Review
Parhizi, S., Lotfi, H., Khodaei, A., & Bahramirad, S. (2015) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2015.2443119 · Cited by 1,194
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Self-citationEnergy-Sharing Model With Price-Based Demand Response for Microgrids of Peer-to-Peer Prosumers
Liu, N., Yu, X., Wang, C., Li, C., Ma, L., & Lei, J. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2017.2649558 · Cited by 855
Solar–wind hybrid renewable energy system: A review
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Distributed Energy Trading in Microgrids: A Game-Theoretic Model and Its Equilibrium Analysis
Lee, J., Guo, J., Choi, J. K., & Zukerman, M. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics · doi:10.1109/tie.2014.2387340 · Cited by 396
Incentivizing Prosumer Coalitions With Energy Management Using Cooperative Game Theory
Han, L., Morstyn, T., & McCulloch, M. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2018.2858540 · Cited by 274
Microgrid clustering architectures
Bullich-Massagué, E., Díaz-González, F., Aragüés-Peñalba, M., Girbau-Llistuella, F., Olivella-Rosell, P., & Sumper, A. (2018) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.12.048 · Cited by 245
A cooperative game approach for coordinating multi-microgrid operation within distribution systems
Du, Y., Wang, Z., Liu, G., Chen, X., Yuan, H., Wei, Y., & Li, F. (2018) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.03.086 · Cited by 205
“In this regard, the authors in [25,26] treat each microgrid as an active cooperative player seeking for potential coalitions with their neighbors to share power and save transmission cost.”
BackgroundEren, Y., Küçükdemiral, İ. B., & Üstoğlu, İ. (2017) · Optimization in Renewable Energy Systems · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-101041-9.00002-8 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Saad, W., Han, Z., & Poor, H. V.
- Venue
- 2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2011-06
- Pages
- 1-5
- ISSN
- 2164-7038 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2142398399
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 19.14
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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