Modeling cyber-attack for SCADA systems using CoPNet approach
Abstract
With the rise of cyber-attack activities in the recent years, research in this area has gained immense emphasis. One of such research efforts is modeling of cyber-attacks. In this context, several modeling approaches have been developed, such as approaches based on attack trees (AT). In this paper, we propose Colored Petri Net (CoPNet) modeling approach by extending the attack trees with new modeling constructs and analysis approaches. CoPNet based attack model is flexible enough to model Internet intrusion, including the static and dynamic features of the intrusion. The process and rules of building CoPNet based attack model from AT are also presented. In order to evaluate the risk of intrusion, some cost elements are added to CoPNet based attack modeling. We show how attack trees can be converted and analyzed in CoPNets. Finally, we provide a case study that illustrates the CoPNet approach.
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Internet connectivity has transformed SCADA systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks, providing benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity but exposing them to global cyber security threats.
“The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks.”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [6]
Genge et al. proposed an emulation-based security analysis framework using Emulab and Simulink that can measure impact of attacks against both physical and cyber parts of systems.
“A framework for emulation based security analysis using Emulab and Simulink is proposed by Genge et al. [6] that can be used to measure impact of attacks against both physical and cyber parts of systems.”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [6]
Cites
No references could be resolved yet.
Research works printed but not linked: 22
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques
Nazir, S., Patel, S., & Patel, D. (2017) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.06.010 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
“Attack trees visually describe the possible attack paths and can be used for risk assessment as described by Bouchti and Haqiq [70].”
Method
- Authors
- Bouchti, A. E., & Haqiq, A.
- Affiliations
- Université Hassan 1er (MA)
- ORCID
- Haqiq, Abdelkrim
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE International Conference on Complex Systems (ICCS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-11
- Volume
- 3935
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W2535891114
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 2.05
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computational Theory and Mathematics › Petri Nets in System Modeling
- Keywords
- cyberattack modeling, SCADA systems, colored Petri nets, attack trees
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