Modeling cyber attacks on a critical infrastructure scenario
Abstract
Critical infrastructures, such as electrical grids, are monitored and controlled by SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems. Cyber attacks against SCADA might put CI and in turn industrial production, environment integrity and human safety at risk. Here, with reference to an actual case study, constituted by an electrical grid, its SCADA system and a corporate network, we discuss how cyber threats, vulnerabilities and attacks might degrade the functionalities of SCADA and corporate network and, in turn, lead to outages of the electrical grid. We represent SCADA and corporate network under malware propagation, Denial of Service and Man In The Middle attacks, and predict their consequent functionalities. Particularly, we use Netlogo to identify possible malware propagation in relation to SCADA & corporate security policies adopted from the utility and NS2 simulator to compute the consequences of such cyber attacks on SCADA and in turn on electrical grid functionalities.
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IDS work by inspecting the network traffic and mainly comprise of two approaches: signature based and anomaly based.
“IDS work by inspecting the network traffic and mainly comprise of two approaches: signature based and anomaly based.”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [14]
The signature detection matches traffic to a known misuse pattern, while the anomaly detection works on the normalities in the observed data and can detect unknown attacks.
“The signature detection matches traffic to a known misuse pattern, while the anomaly detection works on the normalities in the observed data and can detect unknown attacks [14], [15].”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [14]
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Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques
Nazir, S., Patel, S., & Patel, D. (2017) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.06.010 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
“A DoS attack on an actual SCADA system of a medium voltage electrical grid is provided in [64].”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
- Authors
- Ciancamerla, E., Minichino, M., & Palmieri, S.
- Affiliations
- National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development (IT)
- Venue
- IISA 2013
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-07
- Volume
- s4
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W1968647112
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2014: 2
- FWCI
- 2.28
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Conference on Information, Intelligence, Systems & Applications (IISA) (publishedVersion)
- ENEA Open Archive (National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Keywords
- cyberattacks, critical infrastructure, SCADA systems, power grid, malware propagation, denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, corporate networks, network security vulnerabilities, power outages, NetLogo simulation, NS-2 simulation
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