The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On selfish behavior in CSMA/CA networks
Open accessAbstract
CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment. Indeed, with the higher programmability of the network adapters, the temptation to tamper with the software or firmware is likely to grow; by doing so, a user could obtain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users. We use a game-theoretic approach to investigate the problem of the selfish behavior of nodes in CSMA/CA networks, specifically geared towards the most widely accepted protocol in this class of protocols, IEEE 802.11. We characterize two families of Nash equilibria in a single stage game, one of which always results in a network collapse. We argue that this result provides an incentive for cheaters to cooperate with each other. Explicit cooperation among nodes is clearly impractical. By applying the model of dynamic games borrowed from game theory, we derive the conditions for the stable and optimal functioning of a population of cheaters. We use this insight to develop a simple, localized and distributed protocol that successfully guides multiple selfish nodes to a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium.
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Cites
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Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function
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Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory
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Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks
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CDMA Uplink Power Control as a Noncooperative Game
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Detection and handling of MAC layer misbehavior in wireless networks
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DOMINO: a system to detect greedy behavior in IEEE 802.11 hotspots
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Self-citationAn analysis of short-term fairness in wireless media access protocols (poster session)
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Stability of multipacket slotted Aloha with selfish users and perfect information
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Equilibria of a noncooperative game for heterogeneous users of an ALOHA network
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Optimal routing control: repeated game approach
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On Cheating in CSMA/CA Ad Hoc Networks
Čagalj, M., Ganeriwal, S., Aad, I., & Hubaux, J. (2004) · Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) · Cited by 61
Self-citation
Cited by
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges
Wang, W., & Lu, Z. (2013) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2012.12.017 · Cited by 1,123
Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Using Machine Learning in Smart Grid
Esmalifalak, M., Liu, L., Nguyen, N., Zheng, R., & Han, Z. (2017) · IEEE Systems Journal · doi:10.1109/jsyst.2014.2341597 · Cited by 595
Advanced Wi-Fi attacks using commodity hardware
Vanhoef, M., & Piessens, F. (2014) · Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1145/2664243.2664260 · Cited by 152
Metadata
- Authors
- Cagalj, M., Ganeriwal, S., Aad, I., & Hubaux, J.-P.
- Venue
- Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2005-08-24
- Volume
- 4
- Pages
- 2513-2524
- OpenAlex
- W2100954602
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 17.13
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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