The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Eclipse Attacks on Overlay Networks: Threats and Defenses
Abstract
Overlay networks are widely used to deploy functionality at edge nodes without changing network routers. Each node in an overlay network maintains connections with a number of peers, forming a graph upon which a distributed application or service is implemented. In an “Eclipse ” attack, a set of malicious, colluding overlay nodes arranges for a correct node to peer only with members of the coalition. If successful, the attacker can mediate most or all communication to and from the victim. Furthermore, by supplying biased neighbor information during normal overlay maintenance, a modest number of malicious nodes can eclipse a large number of correct victim nodes. This paper studies the impact of Eclipse attacks on structured overlays and shows the limitations of known defenses. We then present the design, implementation, and evaluation of a new defense, in which nodes anonymously audit each other’s connectivity. The key observation is that a node that mounts an Eclipse attack must have a higher than average node degree. We show that enforcing a node degree limit by auditing is an effective defense against Eclipse attacks. Furthermore, unlike most existing defenses, our defense leaves flexibility in the selection of neighboring nodes, thus permitting important overlay optimizations like proximity neighbor selection (PNS). I.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Singh, A., Ngan, T.-W., Druschel, P., & Wallach, D. S.
- Venue
- Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2006. 25TH IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2006
- Pages
- 1-12
- OpenAlex
- W2128672542
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 16.32
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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