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Profit-maximizing incentive for participatory sensing
Abstract
We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users (agents) while at the same time lowering his payout, which we formulate as a profit-maximization problem. We use a contribution-dependent prize function in an environment that is specifically tailored to participatory sensing, namely incomplete information (with information asymmetry), risk-averse agents, and stochastic population. We derive the optimal prize function that induces the maximum profit for the principal, while satisfying strict individual rationality (i.e., strictly have incentive to participate at equilibrium) for both risk-neutral and weakly risk-averse agents. The thus induced profit is demonstrated to be higher than the maximum profit induced by constant (yet optimized) prize. We also show that our results are readily extensible to cases of risk-neutral agents and deterministic populations.
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Reputation-based incentive protocols in crowdsourcing applications
Zhang, Y., & van der Schaar, M. (2012) · 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM · doi:10.1109/infcom.2012.6195597 · Cited by 315
Cited by
A Survey on Mobile Crowdsensing Systems: Challenges, Solutions, and Opportunities
Capponi, A., Fiandrino, C., Kantarci, B., Foschini, L., Kliazovich, D., & Bouvry, P. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2914030 · Cited by 594
Luong, N. C., Hoang, D. T., Wang, P., Niyato, D., Kim, D. I., & Han, Z. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2582841 · Cited by 357
Metadata
- Authors
- Luo, T., Tan, H.-P., & Xia, L.
- Venue
- IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2014-04
- Pages
- 127-135
- OpenAlex
- W2066840620
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 22.50
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Luo, T., Tan, H.-P., & Xia, L. (2014). Profit-maximizing incentive for participatory sensing. IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. https://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2014.6847932
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