Eliciting truthful measurements from a community of sensors
Open accessAbstract
As the Internet of Things grows to large scale, its components will increasingly be controlled by self-interested agents. For example, sensor networks will evolve to community sensing where a community of agents combine their data into a single coherent structure. As there is no central quality control, agents need to be incentivized to provide accurate measurements. We propose game-theoretic mechanisms that provide such incentives and show their application on the example of community sensing for monitoring air pollution. These mechanisms can be applied to most sensing scenarios and allow the Internet of Things to grow to much larger scale than currently exists.
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An extensive line of work in mechanism design focuses on incentivizing high quality reporting in peer grading and other crowdsourcing environments.
“In response to this issue, an extensive line of work in the mechanism design literature focuses on incentivizing high quality reporting in peer grading and other crowdsourcing environments (Prelec 2004;Jurca andFaltings 2009, 2005;Faltings, Li, and Jurca 2012;Witkowski and Parkes 2012;Witkowski et al. 2013;Radanovic andFaltings 2013, 2014;Riley 2014;Kamble et al. 2015;Kong, Ligett, and Schoenebeck”
From Better Peer Grading through Bayesian Inference (2023) · cites this paper as Faltings, Li, and Jurca 2012
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Better Peer Grading through Bayesian Inference
Zarkoob, H., D'Eon, G., Podina, L., & Leyton-Brown, K. (2023) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25757 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
- Authors
- Faltings, B., Li, J. J., & Jurca, R.
- Affiliations
- École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (CH)
- Google (Switzerland) (CH)
- ORCID
- Faltings, Boi
- Venue
- 2012 3rd IEEE International Conference on the Internet of Things
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 34
- Pages
- 47-54
- OpenAlex
- W2076435282
- Cited by
- 18
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 3.88
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- infoscience.epfl.ch
- Locations
- International Conference on the Internet of Things (IoT) (publishedVersion)
- Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
- Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- crowdsensing, incentive mechanisms, Internet of Things, sensor networks, air quality monitoring, self-interested agents, data aggregation
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