Cited by 1,907Security and Verification in ComputingLogic, programming, and type systemsCryptography and Data Security

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 160 of the 164 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Language-based information-flow security

Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.C.·2003·IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Abstract

Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Previously, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this paper, we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of work in the area and identify some important open challenges.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1109/jsac.2002.806121

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Citations

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4 of the 164 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. Barthe, Partial evaluation and noninterference for object calculi, LNCS 1722, 53
  2. Lindholm, 1996, The Java Virtual Machine.
  3. Fenton, 1973, Information protection systems
  4. LaPadula, 1973, Secure Computer Systems: A Mathematical Model, MITRE Corp., Bedford, MA, MTR-2547, vol. 2, 4, 239
  5. Cohen, 1978, Information transmission in sequential programs, 297
  6. Mizuno, Information flow control in a distributed object-oriented system with statically-bound object variables, 56
  7. Mizuno, A least fixed point approach to inter-procedural information flow control, 558
  8. Giambiagi, 2002, Confidentiality for Implementations of Security Protocols.
  9. Pierro, Approximate noninterference, 1
  10. Sutherland, A model of information, 175
  11. Leino, A semantic approach to secure information flow, LNCS 1422, 254
  12. Thiemann, Enforcing security properties by type specialization, LNCS 2028
  13. Abramksy, 1998, Game semantics

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Metadata

Authors
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C.
Affiliations
Cornell University (US)
Venue
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Published
2003-01
Volume
21
Issue
1
Pages
5-19
ISSN
0733-8716 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2122049982
Cited by
1,907
References
164
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 50 · 2021: 65 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 87 · 2018: 67 · 2017: 83 · 2016: 77 · 2015: 101 · 2014: 135 · 2013: 105 · 2012: 122
FWCI
97.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (publishedVersion)
Funders
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Logic, programming, and type systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
information flow security, confidentiality, static analysis, information flow policies, programming languages, policy enforcement, end-to-end security, open problems

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