Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems
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Abstract
Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market- driven mechanisms.
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Cited by
Federated Learning in Smart City Sensing: Challenges and Opportunities
Jiang, J. C., Kantarci, B., Oktug, S., & Soyata, T. (2020) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s20216230 · Cited by 310
Yang, Q., Liu, Y., Cheng, Y., Kang, Y., Chen, T., & Yu, H. (2019) · Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning · doi:10.2200/s00960ed2v01y201910aim043 · Cited by 261
Game Theory for Multi-Access Edge Computing: Survey, Use Cases, and Future Trends
Moura, J., & Hutchison, D. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2863030 · Cited by 193
“game model should incorporate an external mechanism such as pricing [41]–[44], [45], [46] reputation [23], [47], [48], or others [21], [23], [49]–[52], [53].”
BackgroundA sustainable incentive scheme for federated learning
Yu, H., Liu, Z., Liu, Y., Chen, T., Cong, M., Weng, X., Niyato, D., & Yang, Q. (2020) · IEEE Intelligent Systems · doi:10.1109/mis.2020.2987774 · Cited by 123
ABCrowd An Auction Mechanism on Blockchain for Spatial Crowdsourcing
Kadadha, M., Mizouni, R., Singh, S., Otrok, H., & Ouali, A. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2965897 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Luo, T., Kanhere, S. S., Huang, J., Das, S. K., & Wu, F.
- Venue
- IEEE Communications Magazine
- Published
- 2017-03
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 68-74
- ISSN
- 0163-6804 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2595182104
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 26.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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