A Sustainable Incentive Scheme for Federated Learning
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In federated learning (FL), a federation distributedly trains a collective machine learning model by leveraging privacy preserving technologies. However, FL participants need to incur some cost for contributing to the FL models. The training and commercialization of the models will take time. Thus, there will be delays before the federation could pay back the participants. This temporary mismatch between contributions and rewards has not been accounted for by existing payoff-sharing schemes. To address this limitation, we propose the FL incentivizer (FLI). It dynamically divides a given budget in a context-aware manner among data owners in a federation by jointly maximizing the collective utility while minimizing the inequality among the data owners, in terms of the payoff received and the waiting time for receiving payoffs. Comparisons with five state-of-the-art payoff-sharing schemes show that FLI attracts high-quality data owners and achieves the highest expected revenue for a federation.
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“This topic has received a lot of attention in the broader ML community [220, 138, 509, 309, 362, 74], but these methods either do not have a straightforward mapping to federated learning, or make the training process more complex which makes it difficult to adopt.”
From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [74]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Yu, H., Liu, Z., Liu, Y., Chen, T., Cong, M., Weng, X., Niyato, D., & Yang, Q.
- Affiliations
- Nanyang Technological University (SG)
- WeBank
- University of Hong Kong (HK)
- Peking University (CN)
- Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HK)
- Venue
- IEEE Intelligent Systems
- Published
- 2020-07-01
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 58-69
- ISSN
- 1541-1672 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1294
- OpenAlex
- W3016378036
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 6
- FWCI
- 7.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Intelligent Systems (publishedVersion)
- Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Nanyang Assistant Professorship
- NTU-WeBank JRI (NWJ-2019-007, AISG-GC-2019-003, NRF-NRFI05-2019-0002, NTU-SDU-CFAIR (NSC-2019-011))
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
- Keywords
- federated learning, incentive mechanisms, privacy-preserving machine learning, revenue maximization
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