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Cited by 261Chaos-based Image/Signal EncryptionCryptographic Implementations and SecurityComputer Science and Engineering

Cryptanalyzing an image encryption algorithm based on autoblocking and electrocardiography

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Li, Chengqing, Lin, Dongdong, Lü, Jinhu, Hao, Feng·2018·IEEE MultiMedia
DOI 10.1109/mmul.2018.2873472
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Abstract

This paper performs a thorough security analysis of a chaotic image encryption algorithm based on autoblocking and electrocardiography from the view point of modern cryptography. The algorithm uses electrocardiography (ECG) signals to generate the initial key for a chaotic system and applies an autoblocking method to divide a plain image into blocks of certain sizes suitable for subsequent encryption. The designers claimed that the proposed algorithm is “strong and flexible enough for practical applications”. We find it is vulnerable to the known plaintext attack: based on one pair of a known plain-image and its corresponding cipher-image, an adversary is able to derive a mask image, which can be used as an equivalent secret key to successfully decrypt other cipher images encrypted under the same key with a non-negligible probability of 1/256. Using this as a typical counterexample, we summarize some security defects existing in many image encryption algorithms.

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  • In [117], an equivalent secret key can be derived from one known plain-image and its corresponding cipher-image because no permutation operation is adopted.

    “Meanwhile, no permutation operation is adopted in the scheme, causing an equivalent secret key can be derived from one pair of a known plain-image and its corresponding cipher-image.”

    From When an attacker meets a cipher-image in 2018: A year in review (2019) · cites this paper as [117]

    Section 3.1 (pp. 3–4) says one known plain-image and its corresponding cipher-image can yield a mask image that acts as an equivalent secret key. Its use to decrypt another image is conditional on the same secret key and public parameter and a matching plain-image-derived value. Our copy does not attribute the vulnerability to the absence of a permutation operation; Section 3.1 instead discusses a cancelled sensitivity mechanism. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • In [117], the plain-image sensitivity mechanism of a block-wise image encryption scheme using an ECG signal can be canceled with probability 1/256 because it is built via modulo addition.

    “As the sensitivity mechanism on the plain-image is built via a modulo addition, it can be canceled with a non-negligible probability of 1/256.”

    From When an attacker meets a cipher-image in 2018: A year in review (2019) · cites this paper as [117]

    Section 3.1 (p. 3) says the plain-image sensitivity mechanism is cancelled because of modulo addition and gives a probability of 1/256. It specifies that this probability applies if every pixel in the plain-images is uniformly distributed; the citing sentence omits that condition. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The security assessment metrics used in most chaos-based image encryption schemes are unconvincing.

    “As shown in [116,117], the security assessment metrics used in most chaos-based image encryption schemes are unconvincing.”

    From When an attacker meets a cipher-image in 2018: A year in review (2019) · cites this paper as [117]

    Section 3.2 (pp. 5–7) questions several security-assessment metrics used for IEAE, including the Lyapunov exponent, UACI, histograms, and pixel-correlation coefficients. It says IEAE’s security defects also occur in many other image-encryption schemes (p. 4), but does not establish that the metrics used in most chaos-based schemes are unconvincing. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The sensitivity mechanisms of PRNS on the plain-image built in [80,119,27,92] can be easily canceled by constructing special plain-images.

    “For example, the sensitivity mechanisms of PRNS on the plain-image built in [80,119,27,92] can be easily canceled by constructing some special plain-images, which has been reported in many cryptanalysis papers such as [1,117].”

    From When an attacker meets a cipher-image in 2018: A year in review (2019) · cites this paper as [117]

    Section 3.1 (p. 3) says the plain-image sensitivity mechanism in IEAE is canceled by modulo addition, and p. 4 describes an attack when two plain-images generate the same value. The paper does not establish that specially constructed plain-images easily cancel plain-image-dependent PRNS mechanisms across the other cited schemes. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The security test metrics are widely misused in image encryption schemes.

    “The security test metrics are widely misused.”

    From When an attacker meets a cipher-image in 2018: A year in review (2019) · cites this paper as [117]

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Cites

No references could be resolved yet.

Research works printed but not linked: 18

  1. [1][1] L. Bao, S. Yi, and Y. Zhou, 'Combination of sharing matrix and image encryption for lossless ( k ; n )-secret image sharing,' IEEE Transactions on Image Processing , vol. 26, no. 12, pp. 5618-5631, Dec 2017. -
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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Li, C., Lin, D., Lü, J., & Hao, F.
Affiliations
  • Hunan University (CN)
  • Xiangtan University (CN)
  • Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN)
  • Newcastle University (GB)
ORCID
Venue
IEEE MultiMedia
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Published
2018-10-01
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
46-56
ISSN
  • 1070-986X (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0166
DOI
10.1109/mmul.2018.2873472
OpenAlex
W2767875127
Cited by
261
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 49 · 2019: 67 · 2018: 12
FWCI
21.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • IEEE Multimedia (publishedVersion)
  • Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (61772447, 61532020)
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (531107051163)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Computer Science and Engineering
Keywords
image encryption, cryptanalysis, known-plaintext attack, chaos-based cryptography, electrocardiogram, key recovery, image masks, security vulnerabilities

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