The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The “Stuxnet” Virus of 2010 As an Example of A “APT” and Its “Recent” Variances
Abstract
Due the evolution of technology, a new class of sophisticated threats, called Advanced persistent threats (APTs), has arisen and became a pressing problem specially for the industrial security sector. APTs ignited a fire of information warfare where they form cyber-attacks with a high-risk for very critical and secured infrastructures. They targeted a specific companies and governments. The most significant feature of APTs is their ability for bypass high-profile of security systems and steal or tamper information for doing negative impacts on physical objects. Stuxnet virus is an example of APTs that has a specific target and has an ability to destroy its physical infrastructures. It did not need Internet for spreading. It revealed in 2010 and targeted Iran's nuclear program by exploiting four zero-day vulnerabilities in Windows Operating System. In the recent years, a number of different APTs have emerged which increased researchers' attention to analyze them in order to find solutions to protect against existing and future APTs. In this paper, we examine the majority of existing reports and research papers of Stuxnet and APTs to give an overview of characteristics, features, and operations of each of them. We cover Duqu, Flame, Shamoon and Triton as recent variances of Stuxnet. In addition, we highlight the differences and similarities between Stuxnet and these APTs to help in predicting future attacks and encourage the researchers to find solutions to protect against them.
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“Although cyber attacks on SCADA systems are not a new problem, since the earliest recorded cyberattack on SCADA systems dates back to 1982, when a Trojan was found responsible for the explosion of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline [168].”
From SCADA Systems With Focus on Continuous Manufacturing and Steel Industry: A Survey on Architectures, Standards, Challenges and Industry 5.0 (2022) · cites this paper as [168]
Citations
Cites
Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War
Farwell, J. P., & Rohozinski, R. (2011) · Survival · doi:10.1080/00396338.2011.555586 · Cited by 956
Kushner, D. (2013) · IEEE Spectrum · doi:10.1109/mspec.2013.6471059 · Cited by 689
Stuxnet worm impact on industrial cyber-physical system security
Karnouskos, S. (2011) · Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society (IECON) · doi:10.1109/iecon.2011.6120048 · Cited by 542
Chen, T. M., & Abu-Nimeh, S. (2011) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2011.115 · Cited by 398
A Study on Advanced Persistent Threats
Chen, P., Desmet, L., & Huygens, C. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44885-4_5 · Cited by 375
Advanced Persistent Threat: Understanding the Danger and How to Protect Your Organization
Cole, E. (2012) · Cited by 107
W32.Duqu: the precursor to the next stuxnet
Chien, E., O’Murchu, L., & Falliere, N. (2012) · USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats · Cited by 97
Duqu: Analysis, Detection, and Lessons Learned
Bencsáth, B., Pék, G., Buttyán, L., et al. (2012) · Cited by 74
Faisal, M., & Ibrahim, M. (2012) · Cited by 9
Research works printed but not linked: 15
- 2012, Stuxnet malware targets SCADA systems
- cherry, 2010, How Stuxnet Is Rewriting the Cyberterrorism Playbook, IEEE Spectrum
- 2010, Kaspersky Lab Provides Its Insights on Stuxnet Worm
- 0, W32 stuxnet Dossier
- falliere, 2010, Stuxnet Infection of Step 7 Projects
- 2010, Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2010-2772
- bencsáth, 2011, Duqu: A Stuxnet-Like Malware Found in the Wild, Lab of Cryptography and System Security Budapest Univ Technology and Economics
- bencs´ath, 2012, Duqu: Analysis, detection, and lessons learned, Proceedings of European Workshop on System Security (EUROSEC
- yang, 2017, Security Evaluation of the Cyber Networks Under Advanced Persistent Threat
- matrosov, 2010, Stuxnet under the microscope, Tech Rep ES
- goyal, 2012, Obfuscation of stuxnet and flame malware, Proc 3rd Int Conf on Applied Informatics and Computing Theory, 150
- ibrahim, 2012, Duqu and beyond, Int J Sci Eng Invest, 1
- news, 2012, Shamoon Virus Targets Enery Sector Infrastructure
- virvilis, 2013, The Big Four-What we did wrong in protecting critical ICT infrastructures from Advanced Persistent Threat detection?, Proc of the 8th International Conference on Availability Reliability &Security, 248
- gibbs, 2017, Triton: hackers take out safety systems in ’watershed’ attack on energy plant, The Guardian
Cited by
Sverko, M., Grbac, T. G., & Mikuc, M. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3211288 · Cited by 71
“systems was not considered a global issue until the discovery of the Stuxnet worm, developed in 2010 with the specific purpose of targeting ICS [168], and two years later, the Shamoon virus responsible for the attack on Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil company [169], [170].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Al-Rabiaah, S.
- Affiliations
- King Saud University (SA)
- Corresponding author
- Al-Rabiaah, Sumayah
- ORCID
- Al-Rabiaah, Sumayah
- Venue
- 2018 21st Saudi Computer Society National Computer Conference (NCC)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-04
- Pages
- 1-5
- OpenAlex
- W2906723160
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 6
- FWCI
- 24.87
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Saudi Computer Society National Computer Conference (NCC) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Keywords
- Stuxnet, advanced persistent threats, flames, Triton, zero-day vulnerabilities, Windows vulnerabilities, industrial security, Iranian nuclear program, attack prediction
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