An Overview of Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Neural Networks and Possible Defences
Open accessAbstract
Together with impressive advances touching every aspect of our society, AI technology based on Deep Neural Networks (DNN) is bringing increasing security concerns. While attacks operating at test time have monopolised the initial attention of researchers, backdoor attacks, exploiting the possibility of corrupting DNN models by interfering with the training process, represents a further serious threat undermining the dependability of AI techniques. In a backdoor attack, the attacker corrupts the training data so to induce an erroneous behaviour at test time. Test time errors, however, are activated only in the presence of a triggering event corresponding to a properly crafted input sample. In this way, the corrupted network continues to work as expected for regular inputs, and the malicious behaviour occurs only when the attacker decides to activate the backdoor hidden within the network. In the last few years, backdoor attacks have been the subject of an intense research activity focusing on both the development of new classes of attacks, and the proposal of possible countermeasures. The goal of this overview paper is to review the works published until now, classifying the different types of attacks and defences proposed so far. The classification guiding the analysis is based on the amount of control that the attacker has on the training process, and the capability of the defender to verify the integrity of the data used for training, and to monitor the operations of the DNN at training and test time. As such, the proposed analysis is particularly suited to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of both attacks and defences with reference to the application scenarios they are operating in.
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In some existing surveys, WFL was considered as one of the deep learning applications when discussing the impact of backdoor attacks, but no detailed analysis of vulnerabilities of backdoor attacks on WFL was provided.
“On the other hand, in [48], [49], [50], and [51], WFL was considered as one of the deep learning applications when discussing the impact of backdoor attacks, but no detailed analysis of vulnerabilities of backdoor attacks on WFL was provided.”
From Data and model poisoning backdoor attacks on wireless federated learning, and the defense mechanisms: A comprehensive survey (2024) · cites this paper as [50]
In the survey [50], backdoor attack strategies were discussed in depth, but they were not discussed in the context of WFL.
“In the survey [50], the backdoor attack strategies were discussed in depth, but they were not discussed in the context of WFL.”
From Data and model poisoning backdoor attacks on wireless federated learning, and the defense mechanisms: A comprehensive survey (2024) · cites this paper as [50]
For defenders deployed at the client end, the processing capability becomes an inevitable problem.
“While for the defenders that are deployed at the client end, the processing capability becomes an inevitable problem [50], [193].”
From Data and model poisoning backdoor attacks on wireless federated learning, and the defense mechanisms: A comprehensive survey (2024) · cites this paper as [50]
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References 153 · Cited by 91
Research works printed but not linked: 14
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- WEI GUO received the M.Eng. degree from the Department of Computer and Information Secu- rity, Guilin University of Electronic Technology (GUET), Guilin, China, in 2018 with a thesis about "Applied Cryptography in IoT environment" and the B.Sc. degree from the Department of Mathe- matics and Computational Science, GUET in 2015. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate from the Department of Information Engineering and Math- ematics, University of Siena, Siena, Italy. He is doing research on security concerns in deep neural networks under the supervision of Prof. Mauro Barni. He is a Member of Visual Information Privacy and Protection Group.
- Authors
- Guo, W., Tondi, B., & Barni, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Siena (IT)
- Venue
- IEEE Open Journal of Signal Processing
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 261-287
- ISSN
- 2644-1322 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3212158867
- Cited by
- 91
- References
- 153
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 3
- FWCI
- 6.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Open Journal of Signal Processing (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Use Siena air (University of Siena) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Italian Ministry of University and Researchunder
- China Scholarship Council (201908130181)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- backdoor attacks, deep neural network, adversarial learning, attack classification, AI security
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