The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The value of knowing a demand curve: bounds on regret for online posted-price auctions
Abstract
We consider price-setting algorithms for a simple market in which a seller has an unlimited supply of identical copies of some good, and interacts sequentially with a pool of n buyers, each of whom wants at most one copy of the good. In each transaction, the seller offers a price between 0 and 1, and the buyer decides whether or not to buy, by comparing the offered price to his privately-held valuation for the good. The price offered to a given buyer may be influenced by the outcomes of prior transactions, but each individual buyer participates only once. In this setting, what is the value of knowing the demand curve? In other words, how much revenue can an uninformed seller expect to obtain, relative to a seller with prior information about the buyers' valuations? The answer depends on how the buyers' valuations are modeled. We analyze three cases - identical, random, and worst-case valuations - in each case deriving upper and lower bounds which match within a sublogarithmic factor.
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Cites
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The Continuum-Armed Bandit Problem
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Online learning in online auctions
Blum, A. L., Kumar, V. S., Atri Rudra, B., & Wu, F. T. (2004) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2004.05.012 · Cited by 159
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Cited by
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
McSherry, F., & Talwar, K. (2007) · 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07) · doi:10.1109/focs.2007.66 · Cited by 1,371
Towards Sharp Inapproximability For Any 2-CSP
Austrin, P. (2007) · 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07) · doi:10.1109/focs.2007.41 · Cited by 1,294
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits
Slivkins, A. (2019) · Foundations and Trends® in Machine Learning · doi:10.1561/2200000068 · Cited by 780
Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms
Besbes, O., & Zeevi, A. (2009) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.1080.0640 · Cited by 506
Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies
Keskin, N. B., & Zeevi, A. (2014) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1294 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Kleinberg, R., & Leighton, T.
- Venue
- 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings.
- Publisher
- IEEE Computer. Soc
- Published
- 2004-03-02
- Pages
- 594-605
- ISSN
- 0272-5428 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2115905049
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 8.97
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.