Detecting insider threats by monitoring system call activity
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
One approach to detecting insider misbehavior is to monitor system call activity and watch for danger signs or unusual behavior. We describe an experimental system designed to test this approach. We tested the system's ability to detect common insider misbehavior by examining file system and process-related system calls. Our results show that this approach can detect many such activities.
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Citations
Cited by
Detecting and Preventing Cyber Insider Threats: A Survey
Liu, L., De Vel, O., Han, Q.-L., Zhang, J., & Xiang, Y. (2018) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2800740 · Cited by 385
Behavioural biometrics: a survey and classification
Yampolskiy, R. V., & Govindaraju, V. (2008) · International Journal of Biometrics · doi:10.1504/ijbm.2008.018665 · Cited by 311
A Survey of Insider Attack Detection Research
Salem, M. B., Hershkop, S., & Stolfo, S. J. (2008) · Advances in Information Security · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-77322-3_5 · Cited by 280
Homoliak, I., Toffalini, F., Guarnizo, J., Elovici, Y., & Ochoa, M. (2020) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3303771 · Cited by 255
Impact and Key Challenges of Insider Threats on Organizations and Critical Businesses
Saxena, N., Hayes, E., Bertino, E., Ojo, P., Choo, K.-K. R., & Burnap, P. (2020) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics9091460 · Cited by 136
“Moreover, system calls can build profiles of malicious insiders in a system by using two methods: user-oriented model and process-oriented model [85].”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Nguyen, N., Reiher, P., & Kuenning, G. H.
- Venue
- IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics SocietyInformation Assurance Workshop, 2003.
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2004-02-03
- Pages
- 45-52
- OpenAlex
- W2123941465
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.54
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Detecting insider threats by monitoring system call activity. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/smcsia.2003.1232400
- The paper
- Nguyen, N., Reiher, P., & Kuenning, G. H. (2004). Detecting insider threats by monitoring system call activity. IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics SocietyInformation Assurance Workshop, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1109/smcsia.2003.1232400
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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