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A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols
Abstract
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games; these games are formalized in a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus. Our tool provides a generic method for specifying security properties of the cryptographic primitives, which can handle shared-and public-key encryption, signatures, message authentication codes, and hash functions. Our tool produces proofs valid for a number of sessions polynomial in the security parameter, in the presence of an active adversary. We have implemented our tool and tested it on a number of examples of protocols from the literature
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Cited by
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., & Zanella Béguelin, S. (2009) · Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/1480881.1480894 · Cited by 268
Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Heraud, S., & Béguelin, S. Z. (2011) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_5 · Cited by 256
Formal verification of the W3C web authentication protocol
Guirat, I. B., & Halpin, H. (2018) · Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium and Bootcamp on Hot Topics in the Science of Security · doi:10.1145/3190619.3190640 · Cited by 16
Secure and Efficient Block Cipher Mode Design for Parallel Processing and Reliable Security
Vatsavayi, V. K., & Bommireddy, D. R. (2026) · Cryptography · doi:10.3390/cryptography10010013 · Cited by 2
“Researchers use tools like ProVerif and CryptoVerif to mathematically show that the suggested modes are secure against several types of attacks, such as the chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and the chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) [61,62].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanchet, B.
- Venue
- 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'06)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2006
- Pages
- 15 pp.-154
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2108978217
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 17.25
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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