The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain
Abstract
Spam-based advertising is a business. While it has engendered both widespread antipathy and a multi-billion dollar anti-spam industry, it continues to exist because it fuels a profitable enterprise. We lack, however, a solid understanding of this enterprise's full structure, and thus most anti-Spam interventions focus on only one facet of the overall spam value chain (e.g., spam filtering, URL blacklisting, site takedown).In this paper we present a holistic analysis that quantifies the full set of resources employed to monetize spam email -- including naming, hosting, payment and fulfillment -- using extensive measurements of three months of diverse spam data, broad crawling of naming and hosting infrastructures, and over 100 purchases from spam-advertised sites. We relate these resources to the organizations who administer them and then use this data to characterize the relative prospects for defensive interventions at each link in the spam value chain. In particular, we provide the first strong evidence of payment bottlenecks in the spam value chain, 95% of spam-advertised pharmaceutical, replica and software products are monetized using merchant services from just a handful of banks.
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Cites
BotSniffer: Detecting Botnet Command and Control Channels in Network Traffic
Gu, G., Zhang, J., & Lee, W. (2008) · CORE Scholar (Wright State University) · Cited by 702
Your botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover
Stone-Gross, B., Cova, M., Cavallaro, L., Gilbert, B., Szydlowski, M., Kemmerer, R., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2009) · Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653738 · Cited by 577
@spam: the underground on 140 characters or less
Grier, C., Thomas, K., Paxson, V., & Zhang, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866311 · Cited by 558
Self-citationAn evaluation of Naive Bayesian anti-spam filtering
Androutsopoulos, I., Koutsias, J., Chandrinos, K. V., Paliouras, G., & Spyropoulos, C. D. (2000) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cs/0006013 · Cited by 523
Understanding the network-level behavior of spammers
Ramachandran, A., & Feamster, N. (2006) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1151659.1159947 · Cited by 510
Identifying suspicious URLs: an application of large-scale online learning
Ma, J., Saul, L. K., Savage, S., & Voelker, G. M. (2009) · Proceedings of the 26th Annual International Conference on Machine Learning · doi:10.1145/1553374.1553462 · Cited by 498
Self-citationLarge-Scale Automatic Classification of Phishing Pages
Whittaker, C., Ryner, B., & Nazif, M. (2010) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · Cited by 468
Measuring and Detecting Fast-Flux Service Networks
Holz, T., Gorecki, C., Rieck, K., & Freiling, F. (2008) · Publikationsdatenbank der Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft) · Cited by 370
Spamming botnets: signatures and characteristics
Xie, Y., Yu, F., Achan, K., Panigrahy, R., Hulten, G., & Osipkov, I. (2008) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1402946.1402979 · Cited by 339
Spamalytics: an empirical analysis of spam marketing conversion
Kanich, C., Kreibich, C., Levchenko, K., Enright, B., Voelker, G. M., Paxson, V., & Savage, S. (2008) · Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455774 · Cited by 323
Self-citation
Cited by
Traveling the silk road: a measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace
Christin, N. (2013) · Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/2488388.2488408 · Cited by 590
Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime
Anderson, R., Barton, C., Böhme, R., Clayton, R., van Eeten, M. J. G., Levi, M., Moore, T., & Savage, S. (2013) · The Economics of Information Security and Privacy · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39498-0_12 · Cited by 550
Self-citationSuspended accounts in retrospect: an analysis of twitter spam
Thomas, K., Grier, C., Song, D., & Paxson, V. (2011) · Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference · doi:10.1145/2068816.2068840 · Cited by 439
Self-citation(2014) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 121
Systematically Understanding the Cyber Attack Business: A Survey
Huang, K., Siegel, M., & Madnick, S. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3199674 · Cited by 112
“Researchers have begun to study different components of this underground business, including the marketplaces connecting attackers and buyers, and the community of hackers ready to deliver services for a fee [16, 18, 59, 67, 70, 86, 87, 90, 117, 126, 129, 147, 154, 160, 174].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Levchenko, K., Pitsillidis, A., Chachra, N., Enright, B., Felegyhazi, M., Grier, C., Halvorson, T., Kanich, C., Kreibich, C., Liu, H., McCoy, D., Weaver, N., Paxson, V., Voelker, G. M., & Savage, S.
- Venue
- 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2011-05
- Pages
- 431-446
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2121252355
- Cited by
- 254
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 23.56
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp.2011.24
- The paper
- Levchenko, K., Pitsillidis, A., Chachra, N., Enright, B., Felegyhazi, M., Grier, C., Halvorson, T., Kanich, C., Kreibich, C., Liu, H., McCoy, D., Weaver, N., Paxson, V., Voelker, G. M., & Savage, S. (2011). Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain. 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2011.24
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