The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Unleashing Mayhem on Binary Code
Abstract
In this paper we present Mayhem, a new system for automatically finding exploitable bugs in binary (i.e., executable) programs. Every bug reported by Mayhem is accompanied by a working shell-spawning exploit. The working exploits ensure soundness and that each bug report is security-critical and actionable. Mayhem works on raw binary code without debugging information. To make exploit generation possible at the binary-level, Mayhem addresses two major technical challenges: actively managing execution paths without exhausting memory, and reasoning about symbolic memory indices, where a load or a store address depends on user input. To this end, we propose two novel techniques: 1) hybrid symbolic execution for combining online and offline (concolic) execution to maximize the benefits of both techniques, and 2) index-based memory modeling, a technique that allows Mayhem to efficiently reason about symbolic memory at the binary level. We used Mayhem to find and demonstrate 29 exploitable vulnerabilities in both Linux and Windows programs, 2 of which were previously undocumented.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
de Moura, L., & Bjørner, N. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-78800-3_24 · Cited by 6,595
Pin: building customized program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation
Luk, C.-K., Cohn, R., Muth, R., Patil, H., Klauser, A., Lowney, G., Wallace, S., Reddi, V. J., & Hazelwood, K. (2005) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/1064978.1065034 · Cited by 3,180
Symbolic execution and program testing
King, J. C. (1976) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/360248.360252 · Cited by 3,031
KLEE: unassisted and automatic generation of high-coverage tests for complex systems programs
Cadar, C., Dunbar, D., & Engler, D. (2008) · doi:10.5555/1855741.1855756 · Cited by 2,620
Pin: building customized program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation
Luk, C.-K., Cohn, R., Muth, R., Patil, H., Klauser, A., Lowney, G., Wallace, S., Reddi, V. J., & Hazelwood, K. (2005) · Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation · doi:10.1145/1065010.1065034 · Cited by 2,310
CUTE: a concolic unit testing engine for C
Sen, K., Marinov, D., & Agha, G. (2005) · Proceedings of the 10th European software engineering conference held jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering · doi:10.1145/1081706.1081750 · Cited by 1,651
Newsome, J., & Song, D. X. (2018) · Figshare · doi:10.1184/r1/6468716 · Cited by 1,270
Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing.
Godefroid, P., Levin, M. Y., & Molnar, D. A. (2008) · Cited by 1,095
Schwartz, E. J., Avgerinos, T., & Brumley, D. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.26 · Cited by 717
Self-citationS2E: a platform for in-vivo multi-path analysis of software systems
Chipounov, V., Kuznetsov, V., & Candea, G. (2011) · Proceedings of the sixteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/1950365.1950396 · Cited by 514
Cited by
SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis
Shoshitaishvili, Y., Wang, R., Salls, C., Stephens, N., Polino, M., Dutcher, A., Grosen, J., Feng, S., Hauser, C., Kruegel, C., et al. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.17 · Cited by 957
Driller: Augmenting Fuzzing Through Selective Symbolic Execution
Stephens, N., Grosen, J., Salls, C., Dutcher, A., Wang, R., Corbetta, J., Shoshitaishvili, Y., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23368 · Cited by 887
A survey of symbolic execution techniques
Baldoni, R., Coppa, E., D’elia, D. C., Demetrescu, C., & Finocchi, I. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3182657 · Cited by 708
Klees, G., Ruef, A., Cooper, B., Wei, S., & Hicks, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243804 · Cited by 633
VUzzer: Application-aware Evolutionary Fuzzing
Rawat, S., Jain, V., Kumar, A., Cojocar, L., Giuffrida, C., & Bos, H. (2017) · Proceedings 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2017.23404 · Cited by 584
(2021) · doi:10.1109/tse.2019.2946563 · Cited by 574
Angora: Efficient Fuzzing by Principled Search
Chen, P., & Chen, H. (2018) · 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2018.00046 · Cited by 552
S2E: a platform for in-vivo multi-path analysis of software systems
Chipounov, V., Kuznetsov, V., & Candea, G. (2011) · Proceedings of the sixteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/1950365.1950396 · Cited by 514
Firmalice - Automatic Detection of Authentication Bypass Vulnerabilities in Binary Firmware
Shoshitaishvili, Y., Wang, R., Hauser, C., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2015) · Proceedings 2015 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2015.23294 · Cited by 362
discovRE: Efficient Cross-Architecture Identification of Bugs in Binary Code
Eschweiler, S., Yakdan, K., & Gerhards-Padilla, E. (2016) · Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2016.23185 · Cited by 302
LAVA: Large-Scale Automated Vulnerability Addition
Dolan-Gavitt, B., Hulin, P., Kirda, E., Leek, T., Mambretti, A., Robertson, W., Ulrich, F., & Whelan, R. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.15 · Cited by 300
Li, J., Zhao, B., & Zhang, C. (2018) · Cybersecurity · doi:10.1186/s42400-018-0002-y · Cited by 278
Avgerinos, T., Cha, S. K., Rebert, A., Schwartz, E. J., Woo, M., & Brumley, D. (2014) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2560217.2560219 · Cited by 263
Self-citationExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?
Wang, Z., Schiller, N., Li, H., Narayana, S. S., Nasr, M., Carlini, N., Qi, X., Wallace, E., Bursztein, E., Invernizzi, L., et al. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2605.11086 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Cha, S. K., Avgerinos, T., Rebert, A., & Brumley, D.
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-05
- Pages
- 380-394
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2113864883
- Cited by
- 518
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 13.83
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.