The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rozzle: De-cloaking Internet Malware
Abstract
JavaScript-based malware attacks have increased in recent years and currently represent a signicant threat to the use of desktop computers, smartphones, and tablets. While static and runtime methods for malware detection have been proposed in the literature, both on the client side, for just-in-time in-browser detection, as well as offline, crawler-based malware discovery, these approaches encounter the same fundamental limitation. Web-based malware tends to be environment-specific, targeting a particular browser, often attacking specic versions of installed plugins. This targeting occurs because the malware exploits vulnerabilities in specific plugins and fails otherwise. As a result, a fundamental limitation for detecting a piece of malware is that malware is triggered infrequently, only showing itself when the right environment is present. We observe that, using fingerprinting techniques that capture and exploit unique properties of browser configurations, almost all existing malware can be made virtually impssible for malware scanners to detect. This paper proposes Rozzle, a JavaScript multi-execution virtual machine, as a way to explore multiple execution paths within a single execution so that environment-specific malware will reveal itself. Using large-scale experiments, we show that Rozzle increases the detection rate for offline runtime detection by almost seven times. In addition, Rozzle triples the effectiveness of online runtime detection. We show that Rozzle incurs virtually no runtime overhead and allows us to replace multiple VMs running different browser configurations with a single Rozzle-enabled browser, reducing the hardware requirements, network bandwidth, and power consumption.
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Cites
Detection and analysis of drive-by-download attacks and malicious JavaScript code
Cova, M., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2010) · Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web · doi:10.1145/1772690.1772720 · Cited by 580
Cited by
Cookieless Monster: Exploring the Ecosystem of Web-Based Device Fingerprinting
Nikiforakis, N., Kapravelos, A., Joosen, W., Kruegel, C., Piessens, F., & Vigna, G. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.43 · Cited by 425
Yu, T., Sekar, V., Seshan, S., Agarwal, Y., & Xu, C. (2015) · Proceedings of the 14th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks · doi:10.1145/2834050.2834095 · Cited by 311
You are what you include: large-scale evaluation of remote javascript inclusions
Nikiforakis, N., Invernizzi, L., Kapravelos, A., Van Acker, S., Joosen, W., Kruegel, C., Piessens, F., & Vigna, G. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382274 · Cited by 278
Metadata
- Authors
- Kolbitsch, C., Livshits, B., Zorn, B., & Seifert, C.
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-05
- Pages
- 443-457
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2095450067
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.60
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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