The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Crossfire Attack
Open accessAbstract
We present the Crossfire attack -- a powerful attack that degrades and often cuts off network connections to a variety of selected server targets (e.g., servers of an enterprise, a city, a state, or a small country) by flooding only a few network links. In Crossfire, a small set of bots directs low intensity flows to a large number of publicly accessible servers. The concentration of these flows on the small set of carefully chosen links floods these links and effectively disconnects selected target servers from the Internet. The sources of the Crossfire attack are undetectable by any targeted servers, since they no longer receive any messages, and by network routers, since they receive only low-intensity, individual flows that are indistinguishable from legitimate flows. The attack persistence can be extended virtually indefinitely by changing the set of bots, publicly accessible servers, and target links while maintaining the same disconnection targets. We demonstrate the attack feasibility using Internet experiments, show its effects on a variety of chosen targets (e.g., servers of universities, US states, East and West Coasts of the US), and explore several countermeasures.
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Cites
Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data
Clauset, A., Shalizi, C. R., & Newman, M. E. J. (2009) · SIAM Review · doi:10.1137/070710111 · Cited by 8,019
Error and attack tolerance of complex networks
Albert, R., Jeong, H., & Barabási, A.-L. (2000) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35019019 · Cited by 7,534
Cited by
Rafique, W., Qi, L., Yaqoob, I., Imran, M., Rasool, R. U., & Dou, W. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.2997475 · Cited by 358
Metadata
- Authors
- Kang, M. S., Lee, S. B., & Gligor, V. D.
- Venue
- 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-05
- Pages
- 127-141
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2111942706
- Cited by
- 222
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 11.29
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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