The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cookieless Monster: Exploring the Ecosystem of Web-Based Device Fingerprinting
Open accessAbstract
The web has become an essential part of our society and is currently the main medium of information delivery. Billions of users browse the web on a daily basis, and there are single websites that have reached over one billion user accounts. In this environment, the ability to track users and their online habits can be very lucrative for advertising companies, yet very intrusive for the privacy of users. In this paper, we examine how web-based device fingerprinting currently works on the Internet. By analyzing the code of three popular browser-fingerprinting code providers, we reveal the techniques that allow websites to track users without the need of client-side identifiers. Among these techniques, we show how current commercial fingerprinting approaches use questionable practices, such as the circumvention of HTTP proxies to discover a user's real IP address and the installation of intrusive browser plugins. At the same time, we show how fragile the browser ecosystem is against fingerprinting through the use of novel browser-identifying techniques. With so many different vendors involved in browser development, we demonstrate how one can use diversions in the browsers' implementation to distinguish successfully not only the browser-family, but also specific major and minor versions. Browser extensions that help users spoof the user-agent of their browsers are also evaluated. We show that current commercial approaches can bypass the extensions, and, in addition, take advantage of their shortcomings by using them as additional fingerprinting features.
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Cites
How Unique Is Your Web Browser?
Eckersley, P. (2010) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14527-8_1 · Cited by 756
Detection and analysis of drive-by-download attacks and malicious JavaScript code
Cova, M., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2010) · Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web · doi:10.1145/1772690.1772720 · Cited by 580 · cited 2×
“printing, we used a list of 3,804 domains of sites that, when analyzed by Wepawet [27], requested the previously identified fingerprinting scripts.”
MethodSelf-citationThird-Party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology
Mayer, J. R., & Mitchell, J. C. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.47 · Cited by 492
Detecting and defending against third-party tracking on the web
Roesner, F., Kohno, T., & Wetherall, D. J. (2012) · Networked Systems Design and Implementation · Cited by 340
Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It
Turow, J., King, J., Hoofnagle, C. J., Bleakley, A., & Hennessy, M. (2009) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1478214 · Cited by 315
Smart, useful, scary, creepy: perceptions of online behavioral advertising
Ur, B., Leon, P. G., Cranor, L. F., Shay, R., & Wang, Y. (2012) · Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security · doi:10.1145/2335356.2335362 · Cited by 313
You are what you include: large-scale evaluation of remote javascript inclusions
Nikiforakis, N., Invernizzi, L., Kapravelos, A., Van Acker, S., Joosen, W., Kruegel, C., Piessens, F., & Vigna, G. (2012) · Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/2382196.2382274 · Cited by 278
Self-citationFlash Cookies and PrivacyPreprint
Soltani, A., Canty, S., Mayo, Q., Thomas, L., & Hoofnagle, C. J. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1446862 · Cited by 210
An empirical study of privacy-violating information flows in JavaScript web applications
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Rozzle: De-cloaking Internet Malware
Kolbitsch, C., Livshits, B., Zorn, B., & Seifert, C. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.48 · Cited by 168
Cited by
Online Tracking: A 1-million-site Measurement and Analysis
Englehardt, S., & Narayanan, A. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978313 · Cited by 647
The Web Never Forgets: Persistent Tracking Mechanisms in the Wild
Acar, G., Eubank, C., Englehardt, S., Juarez, M., Narayanan, A., & Diaz, C. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660347 · Cited by 455
Privacy in the Smart City—Applications, Technologies, Challenges, and Solutions
Eckhoff, D., & Wagner, I. (2018) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2017.2748998 · Cited by 287
FPDetective: dusting the web for fingerprinters
Acar, G., Juarez, M., Nikiforakis, N., Diaz, C., Gürses, S., Piessens, F., & Preneel, B. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security - CCS '13 · doi:10.1145/2508859.2516674 · Cited by 260
Self-citationPasswords and the evolution of imperfect authentication
Bonneau, J., Herley, C., van Oorschot, P. C., & Stajano, F. (2015) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2699390 · Cited by 258
De-anonymizing Web Browsing Data with Social Networks
Su, J., Shukla, A., Goel, S., & Narayanan, A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/3038912.3052714 · Cited by 95
What Happens After You Are Pwnd: Understanding the Use of Leaked Webmail Credentials in the Wild
Onaolapo, J., Mariconti, E., & Stringhini, G. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference · doi:10.1145/2987443.2987475 · Cited by 74
(2014) · Lirias · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Nikiforakis, N., Kapravelos, A., Joosen, W., Kruegel, C., Piessens, F., & Vigna, G.
- Venue
- 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-05
- Pages
- 541-555
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2045726900
- Cited by
- 425
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 24.28
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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