Privacy Risks with Facebook's PII-Based Targeting: Auditing a Data Broker's Advertising Interface
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Sites like Facebook and Google now serve as de facto data brokers, aggregating data on users for the purpose of implementing powerful advertising platforms. Historically, these services allowed advertisers to select which users see their ads via targeting attributes. Recently, most advertising platforms have begun allowing advertisers to target users directly by uploading the personal information of the users who they wish to advertise to (e.g., their names, email addresses, phone numbers, etc.); these services are often known as custom audiences. Custom audiences effectively represent powerful linking mechanisms, allowing advertisers to leverage any PII (e.g., from customer data, public records, etc.) to target users. In this paper, we focus on Facebook's custom audience implementation and demonstrate attacks that allow an adversary to exploit the interface to infer users' PII as well as to infer their activity. Specifically, we show how the adversary can infer users' full phone numbers knowing just their email address, determine whether a particular user visited a website, and de-anonymize all the visitors to a website by inferring their phone numbers en masse. These attacks can be conducted without any interaction with the victim(s), cannot be detected by the victim(s), and do not require the adversary to spend money or actually place an ad. We propose a simple and effective fix to the attacks based on reworking the way Facebook de-duplicates uploaded information. Facebook's security team acknowledged the vulnerability and has put into place a fix that is a variant of the fix we propose. Overall, our results indicate that advertising platforms need to carefully consider the privacy implications of their interfaces.
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Citations
Cites
Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy Controls
Tucker, C. E. (2014) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmr.10.0355 · Cited by 829
Cited by
Felzmann, H., Villaronga, E. F., Lutz, C., & Tamò-Larrieux, A. (2019) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/2053951719860542 · Cited by 447
Discrimination through Optimization
Ali, M., Sapiezynski, P., Bogen, M., Korolova, A., Mislove, A., & Rieke, A. (2019) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3359301 · Cited by 268
“vary across platforms, but often include demographic attributes, behavioral information, users’ personally identi able information (PII), mobile device IDs, and web tracking pixels [11, 72].”
BackgroundSelf-citationBuilding and Auditing Fair Algorithms: A Case Study in Candidate Screening
Wilson, C., Ghosh, A., Jiang, S., Mislove, A., Baker, L., Szary, J., Trindel, K., & Polli, F. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3442188.3445928 · Cited by 133
“Cooperative audits are unlike existing proposals for audits that involve insider employees [51] or outsider audits where the target company is unaware of the testing (e.g., [6, 53, 60]).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDiscrimination through optimization: How Facebook's ad delivery can lead to skewed outcomes
Ali, M., Sapiezynski, P., Bogen, M., Korolova, A., Mislove, A., & Rieke, A. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1904.02095 · Cited by 72
Self-citationAuditing Offline Data Brokers via Facebook's Advertising Platform
Venkatadri, G., Sapiezynski, P., Redmiles, E. M., Mislove, A., Goga, O., Mazurek, M., & Gummadi, K. P. (2019) · The World Wide Web Conference · doi:10.1145/3308558.3313666 · Cited by 35
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Venkatadri, G., Andreou, A., Liu, Y., Mislove, A., Gummadi, K. P., Loiseau, P., & Goga, O.
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-05
- Pages
- 89-107
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2794651469
- Cited by
- 104
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 49.23
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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