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ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform

Open access
Niaki, Arian Akhavan, Cho, Shinyoung, Weinberg, Zachary, Hoang, Nguyen Phong, Razaghpanah, Abbas, Christin, Nicolas, Gill, Phillipa · 2020 · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Cited by 74

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Researchers have studied Internet censorship for nearly as long as attempts to censor contents have taken place. Most studies have however been limited to a short period of time and / or a few countries; the few exceptions have traded off detail for breadth of coverage. Collecting enough data for a comprehensive, global, longitudinal perspective remains challenging.In this work, we present ICLab, an Internet measurement platform specialized for censorship research. It achieves a new balance between breadth of coverage and detail of measurements, by using commercial VPNs as vantage points distributed around the world. ICLab has been operated continuously since late 2016. It can currently detect DNS manipulation and TCP packet injection, and overt "block pages" however they are delivered. ICLab records and archives raw observations in detail, making retrospective analysis with new techniques possible. At every stage of processing, ICLab seeks to minimize false positives and manual validation.Within 53,906,532 measurements of individual web pages, collected by ICLab in 2017 and 2018, we observe blocking of 3,602 unique URLs in 60 countries. Using this data, we compare how different blocking techniques are deployed in different regions and/or against different types of content. Our longitudinal monitoring pinpoints changes in censorship in India and Turkey concurrent with political shifts, and our clustering techniques discover 48 previously unknown block pages. ICLab's broad and detailed measurements also expose other forms of network interference, such as surveillance and malware injection.

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Cites

Show all 3 references

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Niaki, A. A., Cho, S., Weinberg, Z., Hoang, N. P., Razaghpanah, A., Christin, N., & Gill, P.
Venue
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2020-05
Pages
135-151
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2960535144
Cited by
74
References
3
FWCI
4.74
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp40000.2020.00014
The paper
Niaki, A. A., Cho, S., Weinberg, Z., Hoang, N. P., Razaghpanah, A., Christin, N., & Gill, P. (2020). ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform. 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp40000.2020.00014

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