CoChat

Analyzing Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information in Language Models

Open access
Lukas, Nils, Salem, Ahmed, Sim, Robert, Tople, Shruti, Wutschitz, Lukas, Zanella-Béguelin, Santiago · 2023 · 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Cited by 154

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Language Models (LMs) have been shown to leak information about training data through sentence-level membership inference and reconstruction attacks. Understanding the risk of LMs leaking Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has received less attention, which can be attributed to the false assumption that dataset curation techniques such as scrubbing are sufficient to prevent PII leakage. Scrubbing techniques reduce but do not prevent the risk of PII leakage: in practice scrubbing is imperfect and must balance the trade-off between minimizing disclosure and preserving the utility of the dataset. On the other hand, it is unclear to which extent algorithmic defenses such as differential privacy, designed to guarantee sentence-or user-level privacy, prevent PII disclosure. In this work, we introduce rigorous game-based definitions for three types of PII leakage via black-box extraction, inference, and reconstruction attacks with only API access to an LM. We empirically evaluate the attacks against GPT-2 models fine-tuned with and without defenses in three domains: case law, health care, and e-mails. Our main contributions are (i) novel attacks that can extract up to 10× more PII sequences than existing attacks, (ii) showing that sentence-level differential privacy reduces the risk of PII disclosure but still leaks about 3% of PII sequences, and (iii) a subtle connection between record-level membership inference and PII reconstruction. Code to reproduce all experiments in the paper is available at https://github.com/microsoft/analysing_pii_leakage.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179300

Cites

33 of 33 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 33 references

Cited by

See all 154

Metadata

Authors
Lukas, N., Salem, A., Sim, R., Tople, S., Wutschitz, L., & Zanella-Béguelin, S.
Venue
2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2023-05
Pages
346-363
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4385679821
Cited by
154
References
33
FWCI
29.11
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Analyzing Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information in Language Models. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179300
The paper
Lukas, N., Salem, A., Sim, R., Tople, S., Wutschitz, L., & Zanella-Béguelin, S. (2023). Analyzing Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information in Language Models. 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179300

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.