Insider Threat Identification by Process Analysis
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The insider threat is one of the most pernicious in computer security. Traditional approaches typically instrument systems with decoys or intrusion detection mechanisms to detect individuals who abuse their privileges (the quintessential "insider"). Such an attack requires that these agents have access to resources or data in order to corrupt or disclose them. In this work, we examine the application of process modeling and subsequent analyses to the insider problem. With process modeling, we first describe how a process works in formal terms. We then look at the agents who are carrying out particular tasks, perform different analyses to determine how the process can be compromised, and suggest countermeasures that can be incorporated into the process model to improve its resistance to insider attack.
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Cites
The protection of information in computer systems
Saltzer, J. H., & Schroeder, M. D. (1975) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/proc.1975.9939 · Cited by 2,126 · cited 1×
“…has focused on analyses of how insiders might attack, and has sought to identify attackers and attacks by tactics such as decoys and anomaly detection, and to inhibit attacks by adding technological constraints in accordance with the principle of separation of privilege or separation of duty [60].”
Background
Cited by
Homoliak, I., Toffalini, F., Guarnizo, J., Elovici, Y., & Ochoa, M. (2020) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3303771 · Cited by 255
A Review of Insider Threat Detection Approaches With IoT Perspective
Kim, A., Oh, J., Ryu, J., & Lee, K. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2990195 · Cited by 93
Classification of Insider Threat Detection Techniques
Sanzgiri, A., & Dasgupta, D. (2016) · Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference · doi:10.1145/2897795.2897799 · Cited by 68
“…indicators & language usage in text &official documentation [23-24] Processes and artifacts used & accessed: Analyzed insider threats by using Fault Tolerance Analysis [25] Modeling adversarial behavior & predict attacks: Constructed a Bayesian Model & include environmental features as well [26].”
BackgroundMethod
Metadata
- Authors
- Bishop, M., Conboy, H. M., Phan, H., Simidchieva, B. I., Avrunin, G. S., Clarke, L. A., Osterweil, L. J., & Peisert, S.
- Venue
- 2014 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2014-05
- Pages
- 251-264
- OpenAlex
- W1986566755
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 4.84
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Bishop, M., Conboy, H. M., Phan, H., Simidchieva, B. I., Avrunin, G. S., Clarke, L. A., Osterweil, L. J., & Peisert, S. (2014). Insider Threat Identification by Process Analysis. 2014 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops. https://doi.org/10.1109/spw.2014.40
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