Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 209

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

False Data Injection Attacks on Networked Control Systems: A Stackelberg Game Analysis

Li, Yuzhe, Shi, Dawei, Chen, Tongwen·2018·IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

Abstract

In this paper, a security problem in networked control systems (NCS) is studied. In a standard linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control scenario in NCS, a so-called false data injection attack could be launched by a malicious attacker to deteriorate the system performance without being detected. To defend against such attacks, a defender on the NCS side needs to allocate defense resources among the sensors to secure the data, and the defense investment determines the costs of compromising certain sensors. After observing the defender’ action, the attacker decides the target sensors to compromise. While both sides are subject to the resource constraints, the interactive decision-making between the defender and the attacker is investigated in a Stackelberg game (leader–follower game) framework. The optimal solutions for both sides under different types of budget constraints are analyzed. Simulation examples are provided to illustrate the main results.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/tac.2018.2798817

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Metadata

Authors
Li, Y., Shi, D., & Chen, T.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Published
2018-10
Volume
63
Issue
10
Pages
3503-3509
ISSN
  • 0018-9286 (ISSN-L)
  • 1558-2523
  • 2334-3303
OpenAlex
W2792111770
Cited by
209
References
0
FWCI
10.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: False Data Injection Attacks on Networked Control Systems: A Stackelberg Game Analysis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tac.2018.2798817
The paper
Li, Y., Shi, D., & Chen, T. (2018). False Data Injection Attacks on Networked Control Systems: A Stackelberg Game Analysis. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. https://doi.org/10.1109/tac.2018.2798817

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.