CoChat

Caught in the act of an insider attack: detection and assessment of insider threat

Open access
Legg, Philip A., Buckley, Oliver, Goldsmith, Michael, Creese, Sadie · 2015 · 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)
Cited by 49

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The greatest asset that any organisation has are its people, but they may also be the greatest threat. Those who are within the organisation may have authorised access to vast amounts of sensitive company records that are essential for maintaining competitiveness and market position, and knowledge of information services and procedures that are crucial for daily operations. In many cases, those who have such access do indeed require it in order to conduct their expected workload. However, should an individual choose to act against the organisation, then with their privileged access and their extensive knowledge, they are well positioned to cause serious damage. Insider threat is becoming a serious and increasing concern for many organisations, with those who have fallen victim to such attacks suffering significant damages including financial and reputational. It is clear then, that there is a desperate need for more effective tools for detecting the presence of insider threats and analyzing the potential of threats before they escalate. We propose Corporate Insider Threat Detection (CITD), an anomaly detection system that is the result of a multi-disciplinary research project that incorporates technical and behavioural activities to assess the threat posed by individuals. The system identifies user and role-based profiles, and measures how users deviate from their observed behaviours to assess the potential threat that a series of activities may pose. In this paper, we present an overview of the system and describe the concept of operations and practicalities of deploying the system. We show how the system can be utilised for unsupervised detection, and also how the human analyst can engage to provide an active learning feedback loop. By adopting an accept or reject scheme, the analyst is capable of refining the underlying detection model to better support their decisionmaking process and significant reduce the false positive rate.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/ths.2015.7446229

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

  • Understanding Insider Threat: A Framework for Characterising Attacks

    Nurse, J. R. C., Buckley, O., Legg, P. A., Goldsmith, M., Creese, S., Wright, G. R. T., & Whitty, M. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.38 · Cited by 212 · cited 1×

    “From our Corporate Insider Threat Detection (CITD) research project1, we have studied the many facets that relate to insider-threat detection, resulting in models to support insider-threat detection [1], a framework for assessing insider attacks based on insider-threat case studies [2], and also the extent of impact t…”
    BackgroundSelf-citation

Show all 1 references

Cited by

See all 49

Metadata

Authors
Legg, P. A., Buckley, O., Goldsmith, M., & Creese, S.
Venue
2015 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2015-04
Pages
1-6
OpenAlex
W1859925930
Cited by
49
References
1
FWCI
4.97
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Caught in the act of an insider attack: detection and assessment of insider threat. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/ths.2015.7446229
The paper
Legg, P. A., Buckley, O., Goldsmith, M., & Creese, S. (2015). Caught in the act of an insider attack: detection and assessment of insider threat. 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST). https://doi.org/10.1109/ths.2015.7446229

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.