The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Critical State-Based Filtering System for Securing SCADA Network Protocols
Abstract
The security of System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems is one of the most pressing subjects in industrial systems, particularly for those installations actively using the public network in order to provide new features and services. In this paper, we present an innovative approach to the design of filtering systems based on the state analysis of the system being monitored. The aim is to detect attacks composed of a set of “SCADA” commands that, while licit when considered in isolation on a single-packet basis, can disrupt the correct behavior of the system when executed in particular operating states. The proposed firewall detects these complex attacks thanks to an internal representation of the controlled SCADA system. Furthermore, we detail the design of the architecture of the firewall for systems that use the ModBus and DNP3 protocols, and the implementation of a prototype, providing experimental comparative results that confirm the validity of the proposed approach.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Vulnerability assessment and analysis comprises of a spectrum of techniques from the simplest ones doing port scanning to those involving exploitation of vulnerabilities, as in an actual attack [27].”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [27]
In the citing paper
“SCADA system (Figure 1) differs in characteristics from a conventional information technology (IT) system [8], [27].”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [27]
Citations
Cites
Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks
Roesch, M. (1999) · Cited by 3,094
Process fault detection based on modeling and estimation methods—A survey
Isermann, R. (1984) · Automatica · doi:10.1016/0005-1098(84)90098-0 · Cited by 2,369
Networked Control System: Overview and Research Trends
Gupta, R. A., & Chow, M. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics · doi:10.1109/tie.2009.2035462 · Cited by 1,119
Supervision, fault-detection and fault-diagnosis methods — An introduction
Isermann, R. (1997) · Control Engineering Practice · doi:10.1016/s0967-0661(97)00046-4 · Cited by 962
Alert correlation in a cooperative intrusion detection framework
Cuppens, F., & Miège, A. (2005) · Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy/Proceedings of the ... IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004372 · Cited by 697
Global Intrusion Detection in the DOMINO Overlay System.
Yegneswaran, V., Barford, P., & Jha, S. (2004) · Cited by 289
Natori, K., & Ohnishi, K. (2008) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics · doi:10.1109/tie.2008.918635 · Cited by 198
Security in Building Automation Systems
Granzer, W., Praus, F., & Kästner, W. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics · doi:10.1109/tie.2009.2036033 · Cited by 137
Control Over Imperfect Networks: Model-Based Predictive Networked Control Systems
Onat, A., Naskalı, A. T., Parlakay, E. M., et al. (2010) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics · doi:10.1109/tie.2010.2051932 · Cited by 133
Security Strategies for SCADA Networks
Chandia, R., Gonzalez, J., Kilpatrick, T., Papa, M., & Shenoi, S. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-75462-8_9 · Cited by 87
Flagged first, then by citations
1 of the 28 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- quiang, 2009, A communicaton system architecture for regional control of power distribution networks, Proc 7th IEEE Int Conf INDIN, 372
- nai fovino, 2008, ICT security assessment of a power plant, a case study, Proc 2nd Int Conf Critical Infrastructure Protect
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 101–108 of 108
Flaus, J. (2019) · doi:10.1002/9781119644538.refs
Almalawi, A., Tari, Z., Fahad, A., & Yi, X. (2020) · doi:10.1002/9781119606383.refs
IBEMCS: IDS Baseado em Eventos Multi-Contexto para SCADA
D’Aquino, A. M., Carmo, L. F. R. D. C., Pìrmez, L., & Miceli, C. (2016) · Simpósio Brasileiro de Cibersegurança (SBSeg) · doi:10.5753/sbseg.2016.19302
A Cyber-Risk Management Schema for Classifying Literature on Advanced Persistent Threats
Kumar, R., & Pandey, S. (2025) · doi:10.1109/comsnets63942.2025.10885698
Overview of Cybersecurity Protection for Critical Information Infrastructure
Chen, S., Tao, Y., & Liu, Z. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Computer Communication and Artificial Intelligence (CCAI) · doi:10.1109/ccai65422.2025.11189840
“This is achieved through intrusion detection methods that utilize signature-based detection [9] and anomaly detection [10] to analyze the gathered information and evaluate the detection results.”
Huyen, C. P. T., Dang, N. Q., Nguyen, Q. D., et al. (2026) · Engineering Research Express · doi:10.1088/2631-8695/ae79e9
Metadata
- Authors
- Nai Fovino, I., Coletta, A., Carcano, A., & Masera, M.
- Affiliations
- European Commission (BE)
- University of Insubria (IT)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 3943-3950
- ISSN
- 0278-0046 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-9948
- OpenAlex
- W2005468743
- Semantic Scholar
- fe70d8403056956f99bc8e4ff407d8d5ad87e768
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 3
- FWCI
- 4.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics (publishedVersion)
- Joint Research Centre (European Commission) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Keywords
- SCADA security, firewall design, attack detection, Modbus, DNP3, industrial control systems
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
