ADAM: An adaptive DDoS attack mitigation scheme in software-defined cyber-physical system
Abstract
With the widespread innovation of the Internet of Things, software-defined networking (SDN), and cloud computing, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have been developed and widely adopted to facilitate our daily life and economy. In particular, modern society heavily relies on all kinds of CPSs, such as smart grids, and transportation systems. So the shutdown of critical services can lead to serious consequences. Meanwhile, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are becoming a major threat to the CPSs due to their ease of execution and the devastation they cause. In addition, owing to the constant updating of attack methods, there is an urgent need for a method to defend against both the known and unknown DDoS attacks. In this article, we present an adaptive DDoS attack mitigation (ADAM) scheme to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks in software-defined CPSs. By combining information entropy and unsupervised anomaly detection methods, ADAM can not only automatically determine the current state, but also adaptively identify suspicious features and thereafter precisely mitigate DDoS attacks. We also propose a pipeline filtering mechanism to accurately drop attack traffic, and this method can be implemented in the existing SDN networks without additional devices required. Unlike most of the classification-based DDoS mitigation scenarios, we aim to mitigate a wide spectrum of DDoS attacks without defining attack characteristics in advance. Real data-driven experimental results show that ADAM has an average mitigation accuracy of 99.13% under high-intensity DDoS attacks. Compared to similar work, our method reduces the false-positive rate by 35%-59%.
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The surveyed frameworks enable automated blocking, rerouting, and rate-limiting of malicious flows at the network layer by coupling IDS outputs with SIEM correlation rules, MUD-derived whitelists, SDN/OpenFlow policies, and switch-level filtering.
“By coupling IDS outputs with SIEM correlation rules, MUD-derived whitelists, SDN/OpenFlow policies, and switch-level filtering, the surveyed frameworks enable automated blocking, rerouting, and rate-limiting of malicious flows at the network layer [60-64].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [64]
Cai et al. [64] proposed ADAM, an SDN-based adaptive mitigation method that combines information entropy with unsupervised learning to handle both known and unknown DDoS attacks.
“Using SD-CPS data, Cai et al. [64] proposed ADAM, an SDN-based adaptive mitigation method that combines information entropy with unsupervised learning to handle both known and unknown DDoS attacks.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [64]
This integration is particularly attractive in IoT/IIoT and SDN-enabled CPS environments, where gateways and controllers can dynamically enforce behavior-based policies derived from learned device profiles and traffic patterns.
“This integration is particularly attractive in IoT/IIoT and SDN-enabled CPS environments, where gateways and controllers can dynamically enforce behavior-based policies derived from learned device profiles and traffic patterns [60-62,64].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [64]
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References 38 · Cited by 73
- Authors
- Cai, T., Jia, T., Adepu, S., Li, Y., & Yang, Z.
- Affiliations
- Southwest University (CN)
- University of Bristol (GB)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2023-06
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 7802-7813
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W4320015848
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 10
- FWCI
- 8.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing (CSTB2022NSCQ-MSX0437)
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (SWU-KR22003)
- University Innovation Research Group of Chongqing (CXQT21005)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Software-Defined Networks and 5G
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Network Packet Processing and Optimization
- Keywords
- DDoS mitigation, cyber-physical systems, software-defined networking, adaptive mitigation, Shannon entropy, unsupervised anomaly detection, false positive reduction, Internet of Things security, smart grid
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