Space Decoupled Prototype Learning for Few-Shot Attack Detection in Cyber–Physical Systems
Abstract
Due to the lack of effective attack detection measures, cyberattacks may cause strong damage to industrial cyber–physical systems (CPSs). The embedding of attack categories learned by the existing attack detection methods is highly coupled to each other with fuzzy boundaries and overlapped neighborhood, leading to weak robustness and high false positive rates. To address these issues, in this article, we propose a few-shot attack detection method based on decoupled prototype learning (DPL-FSAD), aiming to enhance the detection accuracy and generalization capabilities for malicious attacks in CPS. Specifically, we first introduce feature contrastive learning to extract differentiated features from highly similar samples, achieving compact intraclass and sparse interclass feature embedding space. To solve the problem of fuzzy boundaries of different attack categories, prototype contrastive learning is then employed to reduce the coupling degree among prototypes and enhance their discriminability. A regularization term is exploited to mitigate the overfitting problem by reducing the gap between the feature embedding and prototypes. Furthermore, an orthogonal constraint is employed to separate prototypes of different attack types, generating a decoupled prototype embedding space. The experimental results on three public cyberattack datasets show that, compared with the suboptimal model a few-shot learning model with Siamese convolutional neural network (FSL-SCNN), the proposed DPL-FSAD can improve the precision by 5.53%,F1-score by 3.3%, and reduce the false positive rate by 2.37% in average, which proves that the space decoupled prototype learning is effective for improving the generalization and robustness of industrial CPS attack detection in few-shot scenario.
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Supervised statistical classifiers tend to achieve high accuracy when ample labeled attack data are available, whereas unsupervised and semi-supervised methods offer better robustness to previously unseen or zero-day attacks at the expense of slightly lower nominal accuracy.
“Supervised statistical classifiers tend to achieve high accuracy when ample labeled attack data are available [13,15,17,20,23,25,32,34], whereas unsupervised and semi-supervised methods offer better robustness to previously unseen or zero-day attacks at the expense of slightly lower nominal accuracy [17,20,21,25,28,34].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [25]
Hybrid designs that combine unsupervised feature learning with supervised classification or active learning frequently achieve a favorable balance between detection rate, label efficiency, and robustness.
“Hybrid designs that combine unsupervised feature learning with supervised classification or active learning frequently achieve a favorable balance between detection rate, label efficiency, and robustness [17,23,25,29,34].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [25]
Several works attempt to bridge the gap between network statistics and process context by combining network statistics with temporal models or with process-oriented datasets such as SWaT, WADI, BATADAL, and Gas Pipeline, but a full characterization of process-level anomalies still requires complementary process or hybrid data.
“Several works attempt to bridge this gap by combining network statistics with temporal models or with process-oriented datasets such as SWaT, WADI, BATADAL, and Gas Pipeline [23,25,29,34], but a full characterization of process-level anomalies still requires complementary process or hybrid data, which are analyzed in later subsections.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [25]
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References 31 · Cited by 11
- Authors
- Sun, H., Huang, Y., Zhou, C., Han, L., Liu, H., Chen, J., & Li, X.
- Affiliations
- Huazhong University of Science and Technology (CN)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2024-10
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 12350-12362
- ISSN
- 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-0050
- OpenAlex
- W4400679044
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 6
- FWCI
- 1.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Key Research and Development Program of China (2022YFB3103402)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62072200, 62172176, 62127808, 61873103, 61433006)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Keywords
- cyber-physical systems, prototype contrastive learning, orthogonality constraints, false positive reduction, Siamese convolutional neural network
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