The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing With Smartphones
Abstract
Smartphones are programmable and equipped with a set of cheap but powerful embedded sensors, such as accelerometer, digital compass, gyroscope, GPS, microphone, and camera. These sensors can collectively monitor a diverse range of human activities and the surrounding environment. Crowdsensing is a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to sense, collect, and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. With the crowdsensing system, a crowdsourcer can recruit smartphone users to provide sensing service. Existing crowdsensing applications and systems lack good incentive mechanisms that can attract more user participation. To address this issue, we design incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing. We consider two system models: the crowdsourcer-centric model where the crowdsourcer provides a reward shared by participating users, and the user-centric model where users have more control over the payment they will receive. For the crowdsourcer-centric model, we design an incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game, where the crowdsourcer is the leader while the users are the followers. We show how to compute the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, at which the utility of the crowdsourcer is maximized, and none of the users can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. For the user-centric model, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism, which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our incentive mechanisms.
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Boyd, S., & Vandenberghe, L. (2004) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804441 · Cited by 56,601
MAUI: making smartphones last longer with code offload
Cuervo, E., Balasubramanian, A., Cho, D.-K., Wolman, A., Saroiu, S., Chandra, R., & Bahl, P. (2010) · Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services · doi:10.1145/1814433.1814441 · Cited by 2,281
Reputation-based incentive protocols in crowdsourcing applications
Zhang, Y., & van der Schaar, M. (2012) · 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM · doi:10.1109/infcom.2012.6195597 · Cited by 315
Cited by
A Survey on Mobile Crowdsensing Systems: Challenges, Solutions, and Opportunities
Capponi, A., Fiandrino, C., Kantarci, B., Foschini, L., Kliazovich, D., & Bouvry, P. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2914030 · Cited by 594
Blockchain-Enabled Data Collection and Sharing for Industrial IoT With Deep Reinforcement Learning
Liu, C. H., Lin, Q., & Wen, S. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2018.2890203 · Cited by 341
Elazhary, H. (2019) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2018.10.021 · Cited by 317
An Efficient Prediction-Based User Recruitment for Mobile Crowdsensing
Wang, E., Yang, Y., Wu, J., Liu, W., & Wang, X. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/tmc.2017.2702613 · Cited by 272
Towards Data Poisoning Attacks in Crowd Sensing Systems
Miao, C., Li, Q., Xiao, H., Jiang, W., Huai, M., & Su, L. (2018) · Proceedings of the Eighteenth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing · doi:10.1145/3209582.3209594 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., & Tang, J.
- Venue
- IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1732-1744
- ISSN
- 1063-6692 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2566
- OpenAlex
- W2438328984
- Cited by
- 439
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 62.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., & Tang, J. (2016). Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing With Smartphones. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. https://doi.org/10.1109/tnet.2015.2421897
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