CoChat

SLICOTS: An SDN-Based Lightweight Countermeasure for TCP SYN Flooding Attacks

Open access
Mohammadi, Reza, Javidan, Reza, Conti, Mauro · 2017 · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Cited by 159

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Software defined networking (SDN) is a novel networking paradigm which decouples control plane from data plane. This separation facilitates a high level of programmability and manageability. On the other hand, it makes the SDN controller a bottleneck and hence vulnerable to control plane saturation attack. One of the key mechanism to achieve control plane saturation is via TCP SYN flooding attack. This is one of the most effective and popular denial of service attack, in which the attacker produces many half-open TCP connections on the targeted server in order to degrade its availability. Furthermore, when applied to SDN, TCP SYN flooding attack also introduces control plane saturation attack. In particular, the attacker generates a significant number of TCP SYN packets and imposes data plane switches to forward them to the controller. As a result, the performance of the controller degrades and the controller will not be able to respond genuine requests in acceptable time. In this paper, we propose SLICOTS, an effective and efficient countermeasure to mitigate TCP SYN flooding attack in SDN. SLICOTS takes the advantage of dynamic programmability nature of SDN to detect and prevent attacks. SLICOTS is implemented in the controller, it surveils ongoing TCP connection requests, and blocks malicious hosts. We implemented SLICOTS as an extension module of OpenDayLight controller and evaluated it under different attack scenarios. The experimental results confirm that, compared to the state-of-art, SLICOTS reduces the response time overhead up to some 50%, while ensuring the same level of protection.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/tnsm.2017.2701549

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 2 references

Cited by

See all 159

Metadata

Authors
Mohammadi, R., Javidan, R., & Conti, M.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Published
2017-06
Volume
14
Issue
2
Pages
487-497
ISSN
1932-4537 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2612104483
Cited by
159
References
2
FWCI
13.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: SLICOTS: An SDN-Based Lightweight Countermeasure for TCP SYN Flooding Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tnsm.2017.2701549
The paper
Mohammadi, R., Javidan, R., & Conti, M. (2017). SLICOTS: An SDN-Based Lightweight Countermeasure for TCP SYN Flooding Attacks. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management. https://doi.org/10.1109/tnsm.2017.2701549

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.