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Investigating the Adoption of Hybrid Encrypted Cloud Data Deduplication With Game Theory
Open accessAbstract
Encrypted data deduplication, along with different preferences in data access control, brings the birth of hybrid encrypted cloud data deduplication (H-DEDU for short). However, whether H-DEDU can be successfully deployed in practice has not been seriously investigated. Obviously, the adoption of H-DEDU depends on whether it can bring economic benefits to all stakeholders. But existing economic models of cloud storage fail to support H-DEDU due to complicated interactions among stakeholders. In this article, we establish a formal economic model of H-DEDU by formulating the utilities of all involved stakeholders, i.e., data holders, data owners, and Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs). Then, we construct a multi-stage Stackelberg game, which consists of Holder Participation Game, Owner Online Game, and CSP Pricing Game, to capture the interactions among all system stakeholders. We further analyze the conditions of the existence of a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium and propose a gradient-based algorithm to help the stakeholders choose near-optimal strategies. Extensive experiments show the feasibility of the proposed algorithm in achieving the Nash Equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Additionally, we investigate the effects of parameters related to CSP, data owners and data holders on H-DEDU adoption. Our study advises all stakeholders the best strategies to adopt H-DEDU.
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There are many schemes involving privacy-preserving solutions based on game theory that trade off data privacy and utility issues.
“There are many schemes involving privacy-preserving solutions based on game theory that trade off data privacy and utility issues [123, 124].”
From Machine Unlearning: A Survey (2024) · cites this paper as [124]
The indexed Abstract describes encrypted cloud-data deduplication with differing access-control preferences and a Stackelberg game that models stakeholders’ economic utilities. It does not say the scheme trades off data privacy against utility, or establish that there are many such schemes. (LLM, conf=0.78)
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References 43 · Cited by 18
Research works printed but not linked: 41
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Metadata
- Authors
- Liang, X., Yan, Z., Deng, R. H., & Zheng, Q.
- Affiliations
- Xidian University (CN)
- Singapore Management University (SG)
- Xi'an Jiaotong University (CN)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
- Published
- 2021-03-01
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 587-600
- ISSN
- 1045-9219 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2183
- 2161-9883
- OpenAlex
- W3092345110
- Cited by
- 18
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 2.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- research.aalto.fi
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems (publishedVersion)
- Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge (InK) (Singapore Management University) (submittedVersion)
- Aaltodoc (Aalto University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (61672410, 62072351, 61802293)
- Academy of Finland (308087, 314203, 335262)
- Shaanxi Innovation Team Project (2018TD-007)
- Higher Education Discipline Innovation Project (B16037)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Data Storage Technologies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Computing and Resource Management
- Keywords
- cloud storage, technology adoption, Stackelberg game, multistage games, Nash equilibrium, data owners, data holders, economic models, gradient-based algorithms
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