Secure and Trusted Execution: Past, Present, and Future - A Critical Review in the Context of the Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Systems
Abstract
Notions like security, trust, and privacy are crucial in the digital environment and in the future, with the advent of technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), their importance is only going to increase. Trust has different definitions, some situations rely on real-world relationships between entities while others depend on robust technologies to gain trust after deployment. In this paper we focus on these robust technologies, their evolution in past decades and their scope in the near future. The evolution of robust trust technologies has involved diverse approaches, as a consequence trust is defined, understood and ascertained differently across heterogeneous domains and technologies. In this paper we look at digital trust technologies from the point of view of security and examine how they are making secure computing an attainable reality. The paper also revisits and analyses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Secure Elements (SE), Hypervisors and Virtualisation, Intel TXT, Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) like GlobalPlatform TEE, Intel SGX, along with Host Card Emulation, and Encrypted Execution Environment (E3). In our analysis we focus on these technologies and their application to the emerging domains of the IoT and CPS.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
TEE offers a tamper-resistant processing environment, running in a separate kernel, providing an acceptable level of originality, integrity, and confidentiality for the data and code to be executed.
“TEE offers a tamper-resistant processing environment, running in a separate kernel providing an acceptable level of originality, integrity, and confidentiality for the data and code to be executed [12,15,16].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
TEE provides a hardware-assisted, fully isolated execution environment that is deemed the core of confidential computing.
“Hardware vendors, such as Intel, AMD, and ARM, have come forward with Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [15] technology that provides a hardware-assisted, fully isolated execution environment that is deemed as the core of confidential computing.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study
Zobaed, S., & Amini Salehi, M. (2025) · Software Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/spe.3398 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
- Authors
- Shepherd, C., Arfaoui, G., Gurulian, I., Lee, R. P., Markantonakis, K., Akram, R. N., Sauveron, D., & Conchon, E.
- Affiliations
- University of London (GB)
- Orange (France) (FR)
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- ORCID
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-08
- Pages
- 168-177
- OpenAlex
- W2586942681
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 6 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 5
- FWCI
- 4.49
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Government of the United Kingdom
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Keywords
- trusted execution environments, Internet of Things, cyber-physical systems, Trusted Platform Module, secure elements, hypervisor, virtualization, Intel SGX, hardware security, digital trust, secure computation
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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