Auction Mechanisms Toward Efficient Resource Sharing for Cloudlets in Mobile Cloud Computing
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Mobile cloud computing offers an appealing paradigm to relieve the pressure of soaring data demands and augment energy efficiency for future green networks. Cloudlets can provide available resources to nearby mobile devices with lower access overhead and energy consumption. To stimulate service provisioning by cloudlets and improve resource utilization, a feasible and efficient incentive mechanism is required to charge mobile users and reward cloudlets. Although auction has been considered as a promising form for incentive, it is challenging to design an auction mechanism that holds certain desirable properties for the cloudlet scenario. Truthfulness and system efficiency are two crucial properties in addition to computational efficiency, individual rationality and budget balance. In this paper, we first propose a feasible and truthful incentive mechanism (TIM), to coordinate the resource auction between mobile devices as service users (buyers) and cloudlets as service providers (sellers). Further, TIM is extended to a more efficient design of auction (EDA). TIM guarantees strong truthfulness for both buyers and sellers, while EDA achieves a fairly high system efficiency but only satisfies strong truthfulness for sellers. We also show the difficulties for the buyers to manipulate the resource auction in EDA and the high expected utility with truthful bidding.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2010) · Introduction to Combinatorics · doi:10.1201/b12336-12 · Cited by 5,632
The case for vm-based cloudlets in mobile computing
Satyanarayanan, M., Bahl, P., Caceres, R., & Davies, N. (2009) · IEEE Pervasive Computing · doi:10.1109/mprv.2009.82 · Cited by 3,660
Demange, G., Gale, D., & Sotomayor, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261411 · Cited by 586 · cited 1×
“tions studied in [6], [7], [8] are not suitable due to the high communication and computation overhead.”
BackgroundCloud-Based Augmentation for Mobile Devices: Motivation, Taxonomies, and Open Challenges
Abolfazli, S., Sanaei, Z., Ahmed, E., Gani, A., & Buyya, R. (2014) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2013.070813.00285 · Cited by 440
Game-theoretic resource allocation methods for device-to-device communication
Song, L., Niyato, D., Han, Z., & Hossain, E. (2014) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.2014.6845058 · Cited by 364 · cited 1×
“communications [10], radio resource allocation [5], deviceto-device communications [16], smartphone sensing [17], and smart grid [18].”
BackgroundSelf-citationAn Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities
Ausubel, L. M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.3.602 · Cited by 272 · cited 1×
“tions studied in [6], [7], [8] are not suitable due to the high communication and computation overhead.”
BackgroundAuction Approaches for Resource Allocation in Wireless Systems: A Survey
Zhang, Y., Lee, C., Niyato, D., & Wang, P. (2013) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2012.110112.00125 · Cited by 257 · cited 2×
“Index Terms—Mobile cloud computing, cloudlet, double auction, incentive design, truthfulness, efficiency Ç”
BackgroundSelf-citationAchieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges
Parkes, D. C., Kalagnanam, J., & Eso, M. (2001) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) · Cited by 231
Truthful auction for cooperative communications
Yang, D., Fang, X., & Xue, G. (2011) · ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc) · doi:10.1145/2107502.2107514 · Cited by 141 · cited 3×
“Index Terms—Mobile cloud computing, cloudlet, double auction, incentive design, truthfulness, efficiency Ç”
BackgroundMigrate or not? exploiting dynamic task migration in mobile cloud computing systems
Gkatzikis, L., & Koutsopoulos, I. (2013) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.2013.6549280 · Cited by 136 · cited 1×
“While this growth leads to increasing revenue to the global mobile industry, there are rising concerns on environmental impact and high capital/operating expenditure.”
BackgroundA survey of mobile cloud computing for rich media applications
Xu, Y., & Mao, S. (2013) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.2013.6549282 · Cited by 120 · cited 1×
“While this growth leads to increasing revenue to the global mobile industry, there are rising concerns on environmental impact and high capital/operating expenditure.”
BackgroundEnergy Saving in Mobile Cloud Computing
Rahman, M., Gao, J. Z., & Tsai, W. (2013) · IEEE International Conference on Cloud Engineering · doi:10.1109/ic2e.2013.37 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“In this paper, we first propose a feasible and truthful incentive mechanism (TIM), to coordinate the resource auction between mobile devices as service users (buyers) and cloudlets as service providers (sellers).”
MethodExploring blind online scheduling for mobile cloud multimedia services
Zhou, L., Yang, Z., Rodrigues, J. J. P. C., & Guizani, M. (2013) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.2013.6549283 · Cited by 41
An Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Mobile Cloud Computing Systems
Zhang, Y., Niyato, D. T., & Wang, P. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39701-1_7 · Cited by 31
Self-citationSocialize spontaneously with mobile applications
Liu, Z., Feng, Y., & Li, B. (2012) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) · doi:10.1109/infcom.2012.6195571 · Cited by 27 · cited 1×
“In this paper, we first propose a feasible and truthful incentive mechanism (TIM), to coordinate the resource auction between mobile devices as service users (buyers) and cloudlets as service providers (sellers).”
MethodIncentive mechanism for collaborative smartphone sensing using overlapping coalition formation games
Di, B., Wang, T., Song, L., & Han, Z. (2013) · Globecom · doi:10.1109/glocom.2013.6831319 · Cited by 22 · cited 1×
“The merging of cloud computing into the mobile domain creates the appealing paradigm of mobile cloud computing (MCC).”
Background
Cited by
A Survey on the Edge Computing for the Internet of Things
Yu, W., Liang, F., He, X., Hatcher, W. G., Lu, C., Lin, J., & Yang, X. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2017.2778504 · Cited by 1,520
Resource Scheduling in Edge Computing: A Survey
Luo, Q., Hu, S., Li, C., Li, G., & Shi, W. (2021) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2021.3106401 · Cited by 588
Mobile Edge Intelligence and Computing for the Internet of Vehicles
Zhang, J., & Letaief, K. B. (2020) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2947490 · Cited by 537
Metadata
- Authors
- Jin, A.-L., Song, W., Wang, P., Niyato, D., & Ju, P.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
- Published
- 2016-11-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 895-909
- ISSN
- 1939-1374 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2523812888
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 17.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.