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Cited by 169Smart Grid Security and ResiliencePower System Optimization and StabilityComplex Network Analysis Techniques

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Modeling Cyber-Physical Vulnerability of the Smart Grid With Incomplete Information

Srivastava, Anurag, Morris, Thomas, Ernster, Timothy, Vellaithurai, Ceeman, Pan, Shengyi, Adhikari, Uttam·2013·IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
DOI 10.1109/tsg.2012.2232318
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Abstract

This paper addresses the attack modeling using vulnerability of information, communication and electric grid network. Vulnerability of electric grid with incomplete information has been analyzed using graph theory based approach. Vulnerability of information and communication (cyber) network has been modeled utilizing concepts of discovery, access, feasibility, communication speed and detection threat. Common attack vector based on vulnerability of cyber and physical system have been utilized to operate breakers associated with generating resources to model aurora-like event. Real time simulations for modified IEEE 14 bus test case system and graph theory analysis for IEEE 118 bus system have been presented. Test case results show the possible impact on smart grid caused by integrated cyber-physical attack.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tsg.2012.2232318

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  • Automated machine learning techniques are more appropriate and efficient compared to human analysts.

    “Thus making automated machine learning techniques more appropriate and efficient compared to human analysts [98].”

    From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [98]

  • An early detection of an intrusion can help to contain its effect and potential damage.

    “An early detection of an intrusion can help to contain its effect and potential damage [98], thus making such techniques extremely useful.”

    From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [98]

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Metadata

Authors
Srivastava, A., Morris, T., Ernster, T., Vellaithurai, C., Pan, S., & Adhikari, U.
Affiliations
  • Washington State University (US)
  • Mississippi State University (US)
ORCID
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Published
2013-03
Volume
4
Issue
1
Pages
235-244
ISSN
  • 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
  • 1949-3061
DOI
10.1109/tsg.2012.2232318
OpenAlex
W1975272849
Cited by
169
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 5
FWCI
17.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplorehelp/downloads/license-information/IEEE.html (vor)
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
Keywords
cyber-physical attacks, incomplete information, attack modeling, attack vectors, graph theory, IEEE 14-bus system, IEEE 118-bus system

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