The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Graphical Methods for Defense Against False-Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation
Open accessAbstract
The normal operation of power system relies on accurate state estimation that faithfully reflects the physical aspects of the electrical power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully synthesized false-data injection attacks can bypass the security system and introduce arbitrary errors to state estimates. In this paper, we use graphical methods to study defending mechanisms against false-data injection attacks on power system state estimation. By securing carefully selected meter measurements, no false data injection attack can be launched to compromise any set of state variables. We characterize the optimal protection problem, which protects the state variables with minimum number of measurements, as a variant Steiner tree problem in a graph. Based on the graphical characterization, we propose both exact and reduced-complexity approximation algorithms. In particular, we show that the proposed tree-pruning based approximation algorithm significantly reduces computational complexity, while yielding negligible performance degradation compared with the optimal algorithms. The advantageous performance of the proposed defending mechanisms is verified in IEEE standard power system testcases.
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Citations
Cites
Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks
Hug, G., & Giampapa, J. A. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2012.2195338 · Cited by 595
Cited by
A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems
Liang, G., Zhao, J., Luo, F., Weller, S. R., & Dong, Z. Y. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2495133 · Cited by 1,028
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey
Deng, R., Xiao, G., Lu, R., Liang, H., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2016.2614396 · Cited by 553
Ghiasi, M., Niknam, T., Wang, Z., Mehrandezh, M., Dehghani, M., & Ghadimi, N. (2023) · Electric Power Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2022.108975 · Cited by 494
Cyber‐physical attacks and defences in the smart grid: a survey
He, H., & Yan, J. (2016) · IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications · doi:10.1049/iet-cps.2016.0019 · Cited by 454
Networked Microgrids: State-of-the-Art and Future Perspectives
Alam, M. N., Chakrabarti, S., & Ghosh, A. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2018.2881540 · Cited by 295
Metadata
- Authors
- Bi, S., & Zhang, Y. J.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Published
- 2014-05
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1216-1227
- ISSN
- 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3061
- OpenAlex
- W2148142324
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Bi, S., & Zhang, Y. J. (2014). Graphical Methods for Defense Against False-Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2013.2294966
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