A Job Market Signaling Scheme for Incentive and Trust Management in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
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Abstract
In collaborative wireless networks with low infrastructure, the presence of misbehaving nodes can have a negative impact on network performance. In particular, we are interested in dealing with this nasty presence in road safety applications, based on vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). In this paper, we consider as harmful the presence of malicious nodes, which spread false and forged data, and selfish nodes, which cooperate only for their own benefit. To deal with this, we propose a distributed trust model$(DTM^{2})$, which is adapted from the job market signaling model.$DTM^{2} $is based on allocatingcreditsto nodes and securely managing these credits. To motivate selfish nodes to cooperate more, our solution establishes the cost of reception to access data, forcing them to earn credits. Moreover, to detect and exclude malicious nodes,$DTM^{2} $requires the cost of sending, using signaling values inspired from economics and based on the node's behavior so that the more malicious a node is, the higher its sending cost, thus limiting their participation in the network. Similarly, rewards are given to nodes whose sent messages are considered truthful and that paid a sending cost considered correct. The latter is a guarantee for the receivers about the truthfulness of the message since, in the case of message refusal, the source node is not rewarded, despite its payment. We validated$DTM^{2} $via a theoretical study using Markov chains and with a set of simulations in both urban and highway scenarios. Both theoretical and simulation results show that$DTM^{2} $excludes from the network 100% of malicious nodes without causing any false-positive detection. Moreover, our solution guarantees a good ratio of reception, even in the presence of selfish nodes.
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Citations
Cited by
A Survey on Recent Advances in Vehicular Network Security, Trust, and Privacy
Lu, Z., Qu, G., & Liu, Z. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · doi:10.1109/tits.2018.2818888 · Cited by 608
“Haddadou et al. [100] propose a distributed trust model (DTM 2 ) to allocate credits to vehicles with secure management.”
BackgroundVehicular Social Networks: Enabling Smart Mobility
Ning, Z., Xia, F., Ullah, N., Kong, X., & Hu, X. (2017) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.2017.1600263 · Cited by 343
A Privacy-Preserving Trust Model Based on Blockchain for VANETs
Lu, Z., Liu, W., Wang, Q., Qu, G., & Liu, Z. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2864189 · Cited by 340
MARINE: Man-in-the-Middle Attack Resistant Trust Model in Connected Vehicles
Ahmad, F., Kurugollu, F., Adnane, A., Hussain, R., & Hussain, F. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2967568 · Cited by 162
Applications of Game Theory in Vehicular Networks: A Survey
Sun, Z., Liu, Y., Wang, J., Li, G., Anil, C., Li, K., Guo, X., Sun, G., Tian, D., & Cao, D. (2021) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2021.3108466 · Cited by 68
“[141] Signaling game × Detect and evict malicious nodes from the network without causing false-positive detection Acknowledgment messages in broadcast may cause high delay or network congestion Selfish and malicious vehicles Credit and reputation”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Haddadou, N., Rachedi, A., & Ghamri-Doudane, Y.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
- Published
- 2015-08
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 3657-3674
- ISSN
- 0018-9545 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-9359
- OpenAlex
- W1995064428
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Haddadou, N., Rachedi, A., & Ghamri-Doudane, Y. (2015). A Job Market Signaling Scheme for Incentive and Trust Management in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology. https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2014.2360883
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