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Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing
Abstract
The recent paradigm of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) enables a broad range of mobile applications. A critical challenge for the paradigm is to incentivize phone users to be workers providing sensing services. While some theoretical incentive mechanisms for general-purpose crowdsourcing have been proposed, it is still an open issue as to how to incorporate the theoretical framework into the practical MCS system. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on a quality-driven auction (QDA). The mechanism is specifically for the MCS system, where the worker is paid off based on the quality of sensed data instead of working time, as adopted in the literature. We theoretically prove that the mechanism is truthful, individual rational, platform profitable, and social-welfare optimal. Moreover, we incorporate our incentive mechanism into a Wi-Fi fingerprint-based indoor localization system to incentivize the MCS-based fingerprint collection. We present a probabilistic model to evaluate the reliability of the submitted data, which resolves the issue that the ground truth for the data reliability is unavailable. We realize and deploy an indoor localization system to evaluate our proposed incentive mechanism and present extensive experimental results.
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Cited by
A Crowdsourcing Framework for On-Device Federated Learning
Pandey, S. R., Tran, N. H., Bennis, M., Tun, Y. K., Manzoor, A., & Hong, C. S. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/twc.2020.2971981 · Cited by 318
Federated Learning in Smart City Sensing: Challenges and Opportunities
Jiang, J. C., Kantarci, B., Oktug, S., & Soyata, T. (2020) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s20216230 · Cited by 310
When Mobile Crowd Sensing Meets UAV: Energy-Efficient Task Assignment and Route Planning
Zhou, Z., Feng, J., Gu, B., Ai, B., Mumtaz, S., Rodriguez, J., & Guizani, M. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Communications · doi:10.1109/tcomm.2018.2857461 · Cited by 302
An Efficient Prediction-Based User Recruitment for Mobile Crowdsensing
Wang, E., Yang, Y., Wu, J., Liu, W., & Wang, X. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/tmc.2017.2702613 · Cited by 272
ZebraLancer: Private and Anonymous Crowdsourcing System atop Open Blockchain
Lu, Y., Tang, Q., & Wang, G. (2018) · 2018 IEEE 38th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) · doi:10.1109/icdcs.2018.00087 · Cited by 224
Metadata
- Authors
- Wen, Y., Shi, J., Zhang, Q., Tian, X., Huang, Z., Yu, H., Cheng, Y., & Shen, X.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
- Published
- 2015-09
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 4203-4214
- ISSN
- 0018-9545 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-9359
- OpenAlex
- W2032596903
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 25.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Wen, Y., Shi, J., Zhang, Q., Tian, X., Huang, Z., Yu, H., Cheng, Y., & Shen, X. (2015). Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology. https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2014.2363842
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