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Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing

Wen, Yutian, Shi, Jinyu, Zhang, Qi, Tian, Xiaohua, Huang, Zhengyong, Yu, Hui, Cheng, Yu, Shen, Xuemin · 2015 · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology

Abstract

The recent paradigm of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) enables a broad range of mobile applications. A critical challenge for the paradigm is to incentivize phone users to be workers providing sensing services. While some theoretical incentive mechanisms for general-purpose crowdsourcing have been proposed, it is still an open issue as to how to incorporate the theoretical framework into the practical MCS system. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on a quality-driven auction (QDA). The mechanism is specifically for the MCS system, where the worker is paid off based on the quality of sensed data instead of working time, as adopted in the literature. We theoretically prove that the mechanism is truthful, individual rational, platform profitable, and social-welfare optimal. Moreover, we incorporate our incentive mechanism into a Wi-Fi fingerprint-based indoor localization system to incentivize the MCS-based fingerprint collection. We present a probabilistic model to evaluate the reliability of the submitted data, which resolves the issue that the ground truth for the data reliability is unavailable. We realize and deploy an indoor localization system to evaluate our proposed incentive mechanism and present extensive experimental results.

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Metadata

Authors
Wen, Y., Shi, J., Zhang, Q., Tian, X., Huang, Z., Yu, H., Cheng, Y., & Shen, X.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Published
2015-09
Volume
64
Issue
9
Pages
4203-4214
ISSN
  • 0018-9545 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-9359
OpenAlex
W2032596903
Cited by
205
References
0
FWCI
25.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tvt.2014.2363842
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Wen, Y., Shi, J., Zhang, Q., Tian, X., Huang, Z., Yu, H., Cheng, Y., & Shen, X. (2015). Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology. https://doi.org/10.1109/tvt.2014.2363842

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