CANDY: A Social Engineering Attack to Leak Information from Infotainment System
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The introduction of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) systems into vehicles make them more prone to cyber-security attacks that may impact of vehicles capability and, consequently, on the safety of drivers, passengers. In this paper, we focus on how to exploit security vulnerabilities affecting user-to-vehicle and intra- vehicle communications to hack the infotainment system to retrieve information about both vehicle and driver. Indeed, we designed and developed CANDY, a set of malicious APP injecting in a genuine Android APP, acting as a Trojan-horse on the Android In-Vehicle infotainment system. It opens a back-door that allows an attacker to remotely access to the infotainment system. We use this back-door to hit the privacy of the driver by recording her voice and collect information circulating on the CAN bus about the vehicle. CANDY is distributed by using social engineering techniques.
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Moreover, recent studies and surveys reported that 84% of cyber-attacks are conducted by social engineers with high success rate [7].”
From Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey (2019) · cites this paper as [7]
In the citing paper
“In [7], the authors described a baiting attack named controller area network (CANDY) to be launched as a trojan horse in the infotainment system of automotive systems.”
From Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey (2019) · cites this paper as [7]
In the citing paper
“This attack impacts the security capabilities of the vehicle by manipulating the communication between the driver and the vehicle.”
From Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey (2019) · cites this paper as [7]
In the citing paper
“It is performed by recording the driver's voice which lets the attacker remotely access the victim's vehicle via back door, collect information about the vehicle circulation, and control the operation of the vehicle.”
From Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey (2019) · cites this paper as [7]
Citations
Cites
Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile
Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., Roesner, F., Patel, S., Kohno, T., Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., et al. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.34 · Cited by 1,957
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- 0, Gas Station Finder
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- miller, 2014, A survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces
- 2011, ISO 26262 - Road Vehicles - Functional Safety, International Organization for Standardization
- 0, AUTOSAR - Automotive Open System Architecture
- 0, The Social Engineering Infographic
- goldman, 0, Fully 84 Percent of Hackers Leverage Social Engineering in Cyber Attacks
Cited by
Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey
Salahdine, F., & Kaabouch, N. (2019) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi11040089 · Cited by 509
“Ransomware attacks restrict and block access to the victim’s data and files by encrypting them [29].”
BackgroundAutoAttacker: A Large Language Model Guided System to Implement Automatic Cyber-attacksPreprint
Xu, J., Stokes, J. W., McDonald, G., Bai, X., Marshall, D., Wang, S., Swaminathan, A., & Li, Z. (2024) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2403.01038 · Cited by 263
A Comprehensive Survey of V2X Cybersecurity Mechanisms and Future Research Paths
Sedar, R., Kalalas, C., Vazquez-Gallego, F., Alonso, L., & Alonso-Zarate, J. (2023) · IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society · doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2023.3239115 · Cited by 159
Secure Operations of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
Han, J., Ju, Z., Chen, X., Yang, M., Zhang, H., & Huai, R. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles · doi:10.1109/tiv.2023.3304762 · Cited by 67
Yathiraju, N., Jakka, G., Parisa, S. K., & Oni, O. (2022) · Advances in information security, privacy, and ethics book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-8693-8.ch007 · Cited by 52
Metadata
- Authors
- Costantino, G., La Marra, A., Martinelli, F., & Matteucci, I.
- Affiliations
- Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IT)
- Venue
- 2018 IEEE 87th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2018-06
- Pages
- 1-5
- ISSN
- 1090-3038 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2883899311
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2019: 3
- FWCI
- 0.61
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
- Keywords
- social engineering, Trojan horse, Android malware, CAN bus, driver privacy, voice recording, in-vehicle communication
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.