Single and Multi-Speaker Cloned Voice Detection: From Perceptual to Learned Features
Open accessAbstract
Synthetic-voice cloning technologies have seen significant advances in recent years, giving rise to a range of potential harms. From small- and large-scale financial fraud to disinformation campaigns, the need for reliable methods to differentiate real and synthesized voices is imperative. We describe three techniques for differentiating a real from a cloned voice designed to impersonate a specific person. These three approaches differ in their feature extraction stage with low-dimensional perceptual features offering high interpretability but lower accuracy, to generic spectral features, and end-to-end learned features offering less interpretability but higher accuracy. We show the efficacy of these approaches when trained on a single speaker's voice and when trained on multiple voices. The learned features consistently yield an equal error rate between 0% and 4%, and are reasonably robust to adversarial laundering.
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Leveraging technologies such as blockchain or privacy-enhancing digital fingerprints can transparently trace content origins.
“Leveraging technologies such as blockchain (Hasan and Salah 2019), or privacy-enhancing digital fi ngerprints can transparently trace content origins (Barrington et al. 2023).”
From Generative AI and deepfakes: a human rights approach to tackling harmful content (2024) · cites this paper as Barrington et al. 2023
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Does Audio Deepfake Detection Generalize?
Müller, N., Czempin, P., Diekmann, F., Froghyar, A., & Böttinger, K. (2022) · Interspeech 2022 · doi:10.21437/interspeech.2022-108 · Cited by 258 · see citing works
YourTTS: Towards Zero-Shot Multi-Speaker TTS and Zero-Shot Voice Conversion for everyone
Casanova, E., Weber, J., Shulby, C., Junior, A. C., Gölge, E., & Ponti, M. A. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2112.02418 · Cited by 200 · see citing works
ADD 2022: the first Audio Deep Synthesis Detection Challenge
Yi, J., Fu, R., Tao, J., Nie, S., Ma, H., Wang, C., Wang, T., Tian, Z., Bai, Y., Fan, C., et al. (2022) · ICASSP 2022 - 2022 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP) · doi:10.1109/icassp43922.2022.9746939 · Cited by 165 · see citing works
End-to-end audio replay attack detection using deep convolutional networks with attention
Tom, F., Jain, M., & Dey, P. (2018) · Interspeech 2018 · doi:10.21437/interspeech.2018-2279 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
WaveFake: A Data Set to Facilitate Audio Deepfake Detection
Frank, J., & Schönherr, L. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.02813 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Combining Automatic Speaker Verification and Prosody Analysis for Synthetic Speech Detection
Attorresi, L., Salvi, D., Borrelli, C., Bestagini, P., & Tubaro, S. (2023) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-37742-6_21 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
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Generative AI and deepfakes: a human rights approach to tackling harmful content
Romero Moreno, F. (2024) · International Review of Law, Computers & Technology · doi:10.1080/13600869.2024.2324540 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
- Authors
- Barrington, S., Barua, R., Koorma, G., & Farid, H.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- ORCID
- Farid, Hany
- Venue
- 2023 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2023-12-04
- Pages
- 1-6
- ISSN
- 2157-4774 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4390489170
- Cited by
- 17
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 8
- FWCI
- 3.02
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- UC Berkeley Center For Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Speech Recognition and Synthesis
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Signal Processing › Speech and Audio Processing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Signal Processing › Music and Audio Processing
- Keywords
- anti-spoofing, perceptual features, spectral properties, learned features, adversarial robustness, financial fraud, disinformation
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